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MAKING PARENTS PAY: INTERSTATE CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT AFTER UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ
KATHLEEN A. BURDETTEt
INTRODUCTION
When Jeffrey Nichols, a wealthy consultant, decided to divorce
his wife of sixteen years in order to marry a younger woman, he was
ordered to pay $9000 a month in support for his three children.'
Believing that the children's grandfather would support them,
Nichols ignored his child support obligations and, instead, lived in
luxury with his second wife for over five years. 2 After cleaning out
his accounts in New York, where the children and his ex-wife still
reside, he moved to Toronto.3 In an attempt to evade law enforcement officials who make it their business to search for "deadbeat
dads," Nichols then moved to Boca Raton, Florida and later to
Vermont. 4 He also attempted to conceal some of his assets by
placing them in his second wife's name and in offshore accounts

that could not be traced.5 The law finally caught up with Nichols
when his second wife, in the process of filing for divorce, signed an
affidavit stating that Nichols had been avoiding child support
payments for five years.'
Nichols, who spent four months in a New York jail,7 owes more
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I See Sixty Minutes: Deadbeat Dads (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 29, 1995),
available in LEXIS, News Library, Rtvrpt File [hereinafter Sixty Minutes].
2 See id.
s See id.
4 See id.
' See Claude Lewis, "DeadbeatDad" Deserved Detention, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Aug. 24, 1995, at 29A, availablein Westlaw, Allnews Database.
6 See Sixty Minutes, supra note 1.
See Greg B. Smith, No-Pay Dad Free But Still Owes Big, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Feb.
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than half a million dollars in overdue child support payments that
he contends he is unable to pay.' While Nichols was "living to the
hilt," his ex-wife says that there were "days she didn't know if she'd
make it, with 3 kids." 9 Federal prosecutors, acting under the Child
Support Recovery Act of 1992,10 eventually indicted Nichols."
State prosecutors asked for, and received, a contempt ruling that
was to keep Nichols, who is believed to be the nation's largest child
support debtor, in jail until he paid at least $68,000 of the support
money he owes. 12
Nichols was released after four months,
however, because he convinced the judge that he could not liquidate
Unfortunately, commented
his assets while he was in jail.'"
Suzanne Colt, a lawyer for New York City who finds deadbeat
parents, results like those in the Nichols case, where the delinquent
parent is indicted and imprisoned, are still the exception to the
rule. 14
A Michigan judge sentenced another deadbeat dad to serve two
to three years in prison for failing to pay a child support obligation
that has accumulated to $140,000 over the last sixteen years. 15 Just
as Jeffrey Nichols fled the state where his children lived in order to
avoid his support obligation, Patrick Law left Michigan less than a
month after a support order was entered against him. 16 Law may
also face similar charges in Arizona, "where he abandoned a second
17
wife two years ago."
The length of time that Nichols, Law, and many others like them
have avoided paying child support illustrates the ease with which
obligations may be avoided by leaving the state that issued the child
support order. Because states are primarily responsible for the
enforcement of support orders,' 8 and states' coercive powers are

27, 1996, at 6.
'See Sixty Minutes, supra note 1.
9Id.

10Pub. L. No. 102-521, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 3403, 3403 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
11See Keep Heat on Deadbeats, PALM BEACH POST, Sept. 5, 1995, at A18.
12See Lewis, supra note 5, at 29A; No. 1 Deadbeat Dad: No Ties to Kids, USA

TODAY, Oct. 27, 1995, at A3.
1s See Smith, supra note 7, at 6.
14See Sixty Minutes, supra note 1.
s See Deadbeat Dad Gets up to 3 Years in Prison, CHI. TRIB., July 21, 1994, at A3
[hereinafter Deadbeat Dad].
16See id.
17

id.
" See Lowell H. Lima & Robert C. Harris, The Child Support EnforcementProgram
in the United States, in CHILD SUPPORT: FROM DEBT COLLECTION TO SOCIAL POLICY
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limited to those within their jurisdictions, 19 additional time-consuming procedures are required whenever a child support order is
sought to be enforced against a nonresident of the issuing state.20
There are also great disparities in the rates of collection and in the
success of locating missing obligors among different states; in cases
where the custodial parent was receiving Aid to Families with
Dependent Children ("AFDC"),2" the ten most successful states
collected support from only twenty-five percent of nonresident
parents, while the least successful states collected support from only
4.1% of nonresident parents. 22 Moreover, when custodial parents
seek to enforce child support orders in other states, as when they
seek to enforce child custody orders, there is a tendency for states
with different substantive child support or custody laws to act
parochially and modify the orders in accordance with their own
2
laws, thus weakening the finality and certainty of support orders.
As the number of children who live in nontraditional households24 increases,2 5 so does the number of children who live in
20, 34 (AlfredJ. Kahn & Sheila B. Kamerman eds., 1988).
19 See ROBERT M. COVER ET AL., PROCEDURE 1436-37 (1988) (discussing Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) (explaining that the "authority of every tribunal is
necessarily
restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established")).
20
See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT, 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 231 (1992) (noting
that the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act contains a uniform long-arm
jurisdictional provision that will allow states to assert jurisdiction over as many
nonresident defendants as is constitutionally possible).
2' The AFDC program was begun in 1935 to provide money to dependent children
in order to "help maintain and strengthen family life and to help [their] ... parents
or relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and personal
independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care and
protection." 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
' See Lima & Harris, supra note 18, at 41 (citing statistics provided by the Federal
Office of Child Support Enforcement). Specific statistics were not provided for nonAFDC families. See id.
23 See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 178 (1988) (discussing
competing Louisiana and California custody orders); California v. Superior Court, 482
U.S. 400, 402-03 (1987) (discussing a custody debate involving competing orders of
California, Texas, and Louisiana). In these situations, states avoid the requirements
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, by finding procedural
or substantive errors in the original orders that make them unenforceable. See
Thompson, 484 U.S. at 180 (explaining that states feel entitled to modify custody
awards that do not conform to their idea of the child's best interests).
24 Nontraditional households are those not comprised of a married mother and
father. See Constance Sorrentino, The Changing Family in InternationalPerspective,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1990, at 41, 41 (defining a traditional nuclear family as
composed of "husband, wife, and children living in one household").
2 See id. at 49-50 & tbl. 8 (noting that in 1988, more than 20% of households with
dependent children were headed by a single parent and that at least 85% of
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poverty. 26 In America today, a significant percentage of the poor
are children, 27 especially children who live in single-mother-headed
households. 21 What is most disturbing about these statistics is that
many of these children have been awarded child support by courts
as a result of paternity or divorce proceedings. 29 Because of the
unwillingness of many noncustodial parents to pay support
obligations, particularly when they are denied visitation rights,30
and because of the difficulties involved in collecting child support
judgments when the noncustodial parents and the children live in
different states, many of these judgments remain uncollected.3"

single-parent households were run by women, whereas in 1960, fewer than 10% of
children lived in single-parent households).
"6 SeeJudith A. Chafel, ChildPoverty: Overview and Outlook, in CHILD POVERTY &
PUBLIC POLICY 1, 2 (Judith A. Chafel ed., 1993) (explaining that the child poverty rate
increased from 1971 to 1991 and is expected to continue to remain high throughout
the 1990s unless remedial measures are enacted).
27 See NATIONAL COMM'N ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN

AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 24 (1991). The authors of the study noted:
[C]hildren are the poorest Americans. One in five lives in a family with an
income below the poverty level ....
Nearly 13 million children live in
poverty, more than 2 million more than a decade ago. Many of these
children are desperately poor; nearly 5 million live in families with incomes
less than half the federal poverty level.
Id. (citations omitted); see also William H. Scarbrough, Who Are the Poor? A
DemographicPerspective, in CHILD POVERTY & PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 26, at 55, 5658, 64-78 (defining poverty and describing its differential impact on societal groups
defined
by age, race, ethnicity, family structure, family size, and geographic location).
28
See AlfredJ. Kahn & Sheila B. Kamerman, Child Support in the United States: The
Problem, in CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 18, at 10, 10 (noting that "[i]n 1985, the
poverty rate for children in female-headed families was 54%, in contrast to a 12% rate
for children in all other families").
" See Lima & Harris, supra note 18, at 42 (citing statistics provided by the Office
of Child Support Enforcement showing that in 1985, approximately 34,000 families
were removed from the AFDC rolls when child support obligations were collected).
-o See Lizette Alvarez, When Dad Wants to Be More ThanJust a Check: Child-Support
System Hurts Many FathersWho Say They Pay Faithfully and Get Little, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
8, 1995, at B1 (reporting that the percentage of child support payments made is
correlated with the noncustodial parent's visitation rights). But see Lenore J.
Weitzman, Child Support Myths and Reality, in CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 18, at 251,
260-61 (citing study results that show no correlation between visitation rights and
payment of child support obligations and noting that "most states explicitly forbid the
withholding of child support in retribution for the denial of visitation").
" See Janelle T. Calhoun, Comment, Interstate Child Support Enforcement System:
Juggernautof Bureaucracy,46 MERCER L. REV. 921,921-22 (1995) (discussing the scope
of the enforcement problem and noting that "the default rate is nearly 50%"). But
see Lizette Alvarez, Dedicated Dads Defy the "Deadbeat"Image, ATLANTA CONST., Oct.
1, 1995, at B4 (explaining the "other side of the story[,] ... that 75 percent of the
nation's 5.3 million parents who were supposed to pay child support in 1991 paid
either all or some of the amount, according to a 1995 Census Bureau report").
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Child support awards are made by state courts, which have
jurisdiction over family law issues.3 2 Although there have been
several attempts in the past century to enact uniform state laws,
which would solve the problems that arise in attempting to enforce
one state's judgment in another state's courts, none of these laws
has been very successful."3 Beginning in the 1970s, the federal
government began to take a more active role in the collection of
child support debt. That action was a response to the myriad
difficulties experienced by custodial parents as a result of the
differences among state laws and from the low priority attached by
law enforcement officials to interstate support obligations.34 In
1975, Title IV-D was added to the Social Security Act,35 which
required states, as a condition of receiving federal AFDC funding,
to provide free child support enforcement services to both AFDC
recipients and other custodial parents.36
Several other federal laws since that time have provided
additional collection mechanisms for parents.37 One of the more
recent federal acts is the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 (the
"CSRA"), 38 which provides criminal penalties for failure to pay
overdue support obligations, 39 provisions allowing the federal
courts to make probation in federal criminal cases dependent on
compliance with child support obligations, 4° and provisions for a
program of state grants to aid in developing and enforcing criminal
laws to punish those who refuse to pay child support when the
parents and the children live in different states.4 '
The passage of the CSRA was motivated by the federal government's interest in reducing the amount of money it spent on federal
benefits, such as AFDC, when the children could receive money
from other sources.42 The House Committee on the Judiciary,
5 See Lima & Harris, supra note 18, at 30 (explaining that states are required to
specify how child support obligations will be established, either by a state court or

administrative agency).
" See infra part II.A (discussing the content and goals of these uniform laws).
See S. REP. No. 1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 42-45 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 8133, 8145-49.

42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1994).
s See 42 U.S.C. § 651 (1994).
37
See infra part I.C.
Pub. L. No. 102-521, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 3403, 3403 (codified as amended in

scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
40

This provision is now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994).

This provision is now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(21) (1994).
This provision is now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12301 (Supp. V 1993).
42 See H.R. REP. No. 771, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1992); see also supra note 21
"
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which recommended passing the bill, noted that "in 1988, 6.4
million children from homes in which the father was absent were
enrolled in ... [AFDC], and that number has steadily increased
since that time."4" Although the House Report does not specifically address what percentage of those children receiving AFDC are
also the beneficiaries of enforceable child support judgments, it
assumes that improved collection methods for child support will
reduce the number of children who will be eligible to receive AFDC
benefits."
Statistics released by the General Accounting Office
support this conclusion because only one-fifth of families who
received welfare benefits also received child support in 1992."5
Health and Human Services Department ("HHS") officials estimated
that more effective child support collection devices could easily
reduce the total expenditure on AFDC entitlements by up to twentyfive percent on an annual budget of approximately 22 billion
46
dollars.
Recently, congressional involvement in the interstate child
support arena has come under constitutional attack from fathers
who challenge the legality of the criminal provisions of the CSRA.4 7
This Comment analyzes the constitutionality of the CSRA's criminal
provisions and explores the consequences of that analysis. If the
challenged provisions are found to be unconstitutional, the federal
government will be required to cease its involvement in the criminal
aspects of child support enforcement, leaving the states to their own
devices. Part I discusses the Commerce Clause theory articulated
by United States v. Lopez" and the federal district courts' dissention
over the application of this theory to the criminal provisions of the
CSRA. Part II provides a picture of the states' performances in
child support collection in the past and describes the beneficial
effects produced by other federal laws in the area of child support
enforcement.
Part III addresses the various constitutional
issues raised by federal involvement in the collection of child
(stating the purposes of AFDC).
43 H.R. REP. No. 771, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1992).
44 See id.
45
See Eric Pianin, GAO Calls HHS's Child Support Enforcement Office Ineffective,
WASH. PosT, July 21, 1994, at A29; see also Diana M. Schobel, Recent Developments:
The Maryland GeneralAssembly, 54 MD. L. REv. 891, 905 (1995) (reporting that 90%
of those eligible to receive AFDC benefits "became eligible because of nonpayment
of child support").
46 See Pianin, supra note 45, at A29.
4"See cases discussed infra part I.B.
48 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
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support debt and the special problems raised by the invocation of
federal criminal penalties to deter and punish child support debtors.
This Comment concludes that the criminal provisions of the CSRA
should be found to be constitutional, both as a matter of law and as
a matter of social policy.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
In UnitedStates v. Schroeder,4 9 the federal district court in Arizona

held that a criminal provision of the CSRA was unconstitutional
because Congress did not have the authority under the Commerce
Clause to implement it.5 ° The same court expanded its reasoning
in United States v. Mussari,51 which also found the provision to

be unconstitutional.52
Attorneys for Jeffrey Nichols hope to
invoke these rulings in their favor because FBI agents arrested
Nichols under the same provision.53 The political response to
the Arizona decisions from President Clinton, who disagreed with
the rulings, was quick. Clinton released a statement emphasizing that federal action is necessary because "[t]he states cannot bring these criminals to justice-especially the 'hard core'
group of parents who flagrantly move from state to state to evade
their obligations." 54 He added that "[p]arental responsibility
does not end at the state line. The taxpayers of America should
be able to expect that the burden of caring for these children will
be placed on the shoulders of the parents-where it rightfully
belongs."5 5 As will be discussed below, several other cases,
which received less publicity, have come to the same conclusion
as the federal district court in Arizona.

" 894 F. Supp. 360 (D. Ariz. 1995).
50 See id. at 362-67.

51 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995).
52 See id. at 1368. In fact, the discussion sections of the Schroeder and Mussari
opinions are often identical.
5
See Frank J. Murray,JudgeFinds Law Unconstitutional,WASH. TIMES, Aug. 28,
1995, at A4 (discussing the Mussaridecision); see also supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text (discussing Nichols's notoriety).
'Justice Ready to Save "DeadbeatParent"Law, CHARLESTON GAzETTE (S.C.), Aug.
29, 1995, at B6.

55 Id.
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A. The Impact of United States v. Lopez
In its holdings, the federal district court in Arizona followed the
logic of a recent Supreme Court case, United States v. Lopez,5"
which held that one criminal provision of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 19907 was unconstitutional because it exceeded
Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause." The Constitu-

tion gives Congress the authority "[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes."59 Decided near the end of the Supreme Court's term in
April, 1995, Lopez generated a great deal of controversy and
litigation during the following summer."0 Marking the first time
since 19371 that the Court struck down a federal law regulating
private activity because it exceeded congressional Commerce Clause
powers,62 Lopez threw into question the presumption that "commerce clause doctrine grants Congress such broad power that
judicial review of the affirmative authorization for congressional
action is largely a formality."6"
In Lopez, the Court articulated a three-part test for when
Congress may regulate activities under the Commerce Clause:
Congress may regulate [1] the use of the channels of interstate
commerce ... [2] the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat
may come only from intrastate activities ... [and, 3] those
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce...[,]
64
i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
m115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702(b)(1), 104 Stat. 4844, 4844 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(q) (1994)).
5 See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
57

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
o See United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495, 497 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that
"United States v. Lopez has raised many false hopes. Defendants have used it as a
basis for challenges to various statutes," and listing 10 court of appeals cases decided
under Lopez).
61In 1937, the Court rejected a rigidly formalistic view of Congress's Commerce
Clause authority and ushered in an era of increased tolerance for regulations under
the Commerce Clause. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49
(1937) (holding that Congress could regulate labor relations of employers engaged
in interstate
commerce).
62
See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-4, at 309 (2d ed.
'9

1988).
65Id. § 5-8, at 316.
" United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629-30 (1995) (citations omitted).

1996]

INTERSTATE CHILD SUPPORT

1477

Although this language does not appear to be very different from
that of the New Deal era cases 65 that formed the basis for the
permissive Commerce Clause doctrine under which Congress
operated for most of this century,6 6 the Lopez Court used the
language to achieve a much more restrictive goal. 7 Since the New
Deal, Congress has had virtually unlimited power to regulate under
the Commerce Clause; the constitutionality of a large number of
6
federal statutes may be in danger if this doctrine changes significantly. 8
' See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that intrastate activity
may be regulated "if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce");
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941) (holding that Congress may regulate
intrastate activities "which so affect interstate commerce... as to make regulation of
them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end");Jones & Laughlin,
301 U.S. at 37 (holding that "[a]lthough activities may be intrastate in character when
separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce
from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that
control").
66See TRIBE, supra note 62, § 5-8, at 316 (describing the extent ofjudicial review
of legislation
enacted under the Commerce Clause).
67
See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
" See David 0. Stewart, Back to the Commerce Clause: The Supreme Court Has Yet to
Reveal the True Significance of Lopez, A.B.A.J., July 1995, at 46, 48 (questioning the
effect of Lopez on other federal criminal statutes that only arguably deal with
"commercial activity," such as the federal crimes of arson of commercial buildings,
carjacking, and possession of drugs).
It is unlikely that the Court will revisit Lopez in the foreseeable future; moreover,
the Court does not seem likely to change its interpretation of the Interstate
Commerce Clause. Since Lopez, the Court has granted certiorari to only three cases
raising Commerce Clause issues, and two of these cases only tangentially concern the
Commerce Clause. First, in Fulton Corp. v.Justus, 450 S.E.2d 728 (N.C. 1994), cert.
granted sub nom. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 115 S. Ct. 1689 (1995), the major issue is
whether North Carolina's corporate income tax and intangible personal property tax
can be viewed as compensatory taxes such that, when considered together, they do
not discriminate against out-of-state corporations. See id. at 729. The resolution of
this question is central to whether North Carolina laws violate the dormant
Commerce Clause. See id. Second, Barnett Bank v. Gallagher, 43 F.3d 631 (11 th Cir.
1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 39 (1995), involves the interpretation of federal and
state provisions to determine whether the statutes in question are truly regulations
of "the business of insurance." Id. at 636. Answering this question will probably
entail an examination of the congressional understanding of Commerce Clause
authority in 1916, the year the statute was passed. See id.
Finally, the most potentially significant impact on Commerce Clause doctrine
comes from the Court's recent decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, No. 94-12, 1996
WL 134309 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1996). The Court held that Congress does not have the
authority to abrogate a state's 11 th Amendment immunity from suit, see U.S. CONST.
amend XI, when the state acts under the authority of the Indian Commerce Clause,
see U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See Seminole Tribe, 1996 WL 134309, at *3. The
Court had previously allowed Congress to abrogate states' 11th Amendment
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The federal district court in Arizona decided that federal
involvement in child support enforcement is constitutionally inappropriate.
The portion of the CSRA that was overturned in
Schroeder and Mussari makes it a federal crime to "willfully fail[] to
pay a past due support obligation with respect to a child who resides
in another State," and provides both fines and terms of imprisonment for those convicted under the statute.69 The district court
found that the constitutionality of this provision should be judged
by the third criterion established in Lopez: whether the failure to
pay child support obligations "substantially affect[s] interstate com-

immunity when acting pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause. See Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19 (1989) (plurality opinion). Applying the logic of that
case, the Court found that there was "no principled distinction in favor of the States
to be drawn between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce
Clause." Seminole Tribe, 1996 WL 134309, at *10. By overruling Union Gas, the
Court clarified its belief that Congress may not abrogate a state's immunity from suit
when it legislates under the Interstate Commerce Clause. See id. at *13. This ruling
could provide strong precedent for a line of cases that would limit Congress's
authority to act under the Interstate Commerce Clause when such regulation
threatens principles of federalism, as it does in this case. While it is highly unlikely
that the decision in Seminole Tribe will directly affect any of the litigation under Lopez,
this decision may well be indicative of the direction of the Court's leaning with regard
to the appropriate balances of state and federal power.
69 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994). The complete section reads as follows:
Failure to pay legal child support obligations.
(a) Offense.-Whoever willfully fails to pay a past due support obligation
with respect to a child who resides in another State shall be punished as
provided in subsection (b).
(b) Punishment.-The punishment for an offense under this section is(1) in the case of a first offense under this section, a fine under this
title, imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or both; and
(2) in any other case, a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more
than 2 years, or both.
(c) Restitution.-Upon a conviction under this section, the court shall order
restitution under section 3663 in an amount equal to the past due support
obligation as it exists at the time of sentencing.
(d) Definitions.-As used in this section(1) the term "past due support obligation" means any amount(A) determined under a court order or an order of an
administrative process pursuant to the law of a State to
be due from a person for the support and maintenance
of a child or of a child and the parent with whom the
child is living; and
(B) that has remained unpaid for a period longer than
one year, or is greater than $5,000; and
(2) the term "State" includes the District of Columbia, and any
other possession or territory of the United States.
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merce." 7° In some of the other federal district courts' cases, the
theories advanced in support of the provision failed to demonstrate
a sufficient connection between interstate commerce and the
punishment of delinquent child support obligors for the courts to

justify federal intervention. 7' The Schroeder court found that "the
fact that this statute is a criminal statute aimed at an area of activity
which has already been addressed by the States supports this court's
finding that the [provision] is not substantially related to interstate
commerce."

72

B. The District Court Split
Several other federal district courts have ruled on the constitutionality of the criminal provision at issue in Schroeder and
Mussari.7 3 In United States v. Bailey, 74 a federal district court in
Texas agreed with the Schroeder and Mussari courts in finding § 228
of the CSRA ("§ 228")71 unconstitutional. 76 A federal district
court in Pennsylvania, in United States v. Parker,77 also reached the
7
same conclusion, although its rationale was slightly different.
Five cases have gone the other way, however, upholding the statute's
constitutionality. 79 These cases argue that the failure to pay child
7

0 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630; see also United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360,
1363 (D. Ariz. 1995) (asserting that "if [§ 228 of] the CSRA is to be upheld, it would
have to be as a regulation of activities having a 'substantial relation to interstate
commerce'" (quoting Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30)); United States v. Schroeder, 894
F. Supp. 360, 364 (D. Ariz. 1995) (same).
71 See infra notes 245-54 and accompanying text.
Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 364.
7 As of the date of this Comment, no court of appeals has ruled on the
constitutionality of§ 228. The following cases are currently before the circuit courts:
United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995), appealdocketed, No. 95-2018
(3d Cir. Nov. 30, 1995); United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84 (D. Conn. 1995),
appeal docketed, No. 96-1007 (2d Cir. Jan. 2, 1996); United. States v. Bailey, 902 F.
Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex. 1995), appeal docketed, No. 95-50721 (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 1995);
United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360 (D. Ariz. 1995), appeal docketed, No. 9510513 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 1995); and United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327 (D.
Kan. 1995), appeal docketed, No. 96-3007 (10th Cir. Jan. 5, 1996).
7' 902 F. Stipp. 727 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
7 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994).
7 See Bailey, 902 F. Supp. at 730.
778 911 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
See infra notes 236, 248-54 and accompanying text.
79 See United States v. Kegel, No. 95-300-CR-T-21(E), 1996 WL 69725, at *2 (M.D.
Fla. Feb. 13, 1996) (finding that "upon close analysis there is a rational link between
commerce and the harm proscribed by this statute"); United States v. Sage, 906 F.
Supp. 84, 92 (D. Conn. 1995) (finding that a "rational basis exists for finding that
non-payment of past due child support substantially affects interstate commerce");

1480 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 1469
support is an economic activity that has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce when all individual instances of nonpayment
are aggregated."0 The fundamental points of contention between
the courts upholding the statute and those striking down the statute
seem to be the definition of the concept of "commerce" and the
concern that the definition must be carefully constructed to provide
meaningful limits to the concept.
In applying the standards set forth in Lopez, the federal district
courts disagree in four main areas: (1) whether the statute has a
valid jurisdictional element that establishes an interstate link;8 1 (2)
whether the activities regulated in the criminal statute qualify as
"commerce"; 2 (3) whether the legislative history supports a
conclusion that interstate commerce is being regulated;" and (4)
whether general principles of federalism and comity support this
exercise of congressional authority.8 4 In resolving the Tenth
Amendment question,8" which is essentially the converse of
Commerce Clause analysis,8 6 the courts also raise issues concerning
the doctrine requiring federal court abstention in the area of
domestic relations and other federal abstention doctrines.8 7 The
final resolution of these issues will determine what role the federal

United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389, 394 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (finding that the
statute "specifically limits itself to circumstances involving interstate commerce" and
"the collection of child support payments is a matter that substantially affects
interstate commerce"); United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614, 616 (W.D. Va.
1995) (finding that the statute has "a jurisdictional element that ensures it will not
intrude upon matters with no relation to interstate commerce"); United States v.
Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327, 1331 (D. Kan. 1995) (finding that the statute is
constitutional "because the requirement of an interstate relationship is one of the
explicit elements of the crime").
o See e.g., Hopper, 899 F. Supp. at 393 (finding that the "collection of child
support orders across state lines does involve a continuous and indivisible stream of
intercourse among the states").
8' See infra part III.A.1.
s See infra part III.A.2.
See infra part III.A.3.
• See infra part III.A.4.
See U.S. CONST. amend X.
8' If Congress has acted within the limits of its Commerce Clause authority, then
it has acted constitutionally. If Congress has overstepped the limits of the authority
granted in its enumerated powers, however, then Congress has violated the Tenth
Amendment by infringing on the powers reserved to the states. See infra part
III.A.4.a; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-56 (1992) (holding that
the Tenth Amendment and Commerce Clause analyses are "mirror images of each
other").
87
See infra part III.A.4.b.
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government may take in creating more effective child support
collection and enforcement policies.
II. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF STATE VERSUS
FEDERAL CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT
The necessary consequence of finding § 228 unconstitutional
under the Commerce Clause is that child support enforcement will
be left solely to state civil enforcement provisions and state criminal
law.88 The Schroeder court argues that this is a desirable result
because the current civil and criminal enforcement scheme is
effective.89 Likewise, the Bailey court feels that state action has
been more than adequate in enforcing child supportjudgments. To
support its conclusion that "numerous remedies" exist to enforce
the rights of custodial parents, the court lists fifteen pieces of Texas
legislation that directly concern child support enforcement ° On
the other hand, the court in Parker admits that child support
enforcement in the United States is a problem and that federal
criminal laws may be the only available means to solve this problem,
but nonetheless it maintains that § 228 is an unconstitutional use of
congressional power to achieve worthy objectives. 9'
Contrary to the argument in Bailey, the multiplicity of state
statutes concerning remedies for custodial parents in child support
cases does not necessarily mean that those statutes are effective,
particularly in interstate enforcement actions. In 1992, only one
of every ten dollars ordered to be paid in interstate child support
cases was actually collected. 92 One of the reasons that states are
ineffective collectors in interstate cases is that the reach of state

" The federal government, however, is not completely powerless. The federal

government, using its spending power, may require that states adopt particular
regulations as a necessary condition of receiving federal funding for child support
enforcement agencies but would be unable to regulate individual behavior directly.

See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cI. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes... to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare
of the United States ....

").

s See United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360, 364 (D. Ariz. 1995).
See United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727, 729-30 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
91 See United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830, 843 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ("In its effort
to solve the problem being experienced by many states in collecting unpaid child
support, Congress, though well-intentioned, exceeded its authority and invaded the
realm of sovereignty carefully reserved to the states.").

92 See JUDITH AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 112 (3d ed. Supp.
1995) (citing a 1992 report to Congress, entitled SupportingOurChildren, A Blueprint
for Reform, that was written by the U.S. Commission on Interstate Child Support).
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statutes is limited to those people within their jurisdiction.
Thus, state law has an inherent disadvantage when it is compared to
federal law in extraterritorial interstate proceedings. The reasons
why federal involvement in interstate cases is an important, and
perhaps crucial, factor in the effort to improve child support
enforcement beyond its current level of marginal effectiveness is
discussed below.

A. Past Attempts By States to Improve Interstate Enforcement
In the last century, there have been several attempts by the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the "Commissioners") to
pass uniform laws simplifying the enforcement procedure for out-ofstate judgments.94 One of the difficulties with these uniform state
acts is that they are often changed by state legislatures;9 5 although
the individual changes may be minor, the convenience and
simplicity of having a uniform law is destroyed when practitioners
must deal with many small variations among states. Another source
of confusion arises in cases in which a new or revised uniform act
replaces an old one. Although many states repeal the old uniform
act when they adopt the new one, some states choose to enact the
new uniform act without repealing the old one."6 This leads to
confusion as to whether procedures from the old act may remain
effective in instances in which the new act does not specify
otherwise.

93 See COVER ET AL., supra note 19, at 1434-42 (discussing the territorial
jurisdiction prerequisite for state courts).
Two early efforts at creating uniform laws were the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act ("URESA"), see 9B U.L.A. 553 (1958), and
the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act ("RURESA"), see
9B U.L.A. 381 (1968). Although every state passed either URESA or RURESA,
thereby putting a simplified enforcement procedure in place, interstate judgments remained difficult to collect. See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT AcT,
Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 230 (1992) (noting that "some version of URESA
or RURESA has been adopted in all states"). The most recent attempt to pass a
uniform law, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ("UIFSA") was designed to
correct the flaws of URESA and RURESA. See id. UIFSA has been adopted, albeit
in slightly modified form, by 20 states to date. See Table ofJurisdictions, 9 U.L.A.
pt. I, at 229.
"' See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
9 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT, General Statutory Note, 9 U.L.A.

pt. I, at 233 (1992) (noting that of the 20 states that have enacted UIFSA to date,
three of those states, Arizona, Illinois, and Oregon, enacted UIFSA without repealing
RURESA).

1996]

INTERSTATE CHILD SUPPORT

1483

1. UDNA
In 1910, the Commissioners proposed the Uniform Desertion
and Nonsupport Act ("UDNA"), 9" which was eventually adopted in
twenty-one states. 98 UDNA's effectiveness was limited because it
only provided for criminalpenalties for failure to pay either alimony
or child support; UDNA did not provide any civil provisions for the
collection of debts. 9 The usefulness of the criminal provision was
also limited by the Act's failure to instate direct interstate enforcement procedures.'0 0 A prerequisite to bringing criminal charges
under the statute, in instances in which the father had fled from his
dependents' state of residence, was the return of the father, either
voluntarily or through extradition, to the state that issued the
Not only was it difficult for custodial
original support order.'
parents to prove one of the requirements for extradition, that the
97 10 U.L.A. 1 (1910) (Act withdrawn 1966).
9
s See COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
THIRTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING 34 (1926). UDNA was adopted in full by Alabama,
California, Idaho, Kansas, North Dakota, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Six states,
Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, and Virginia, adopted the Act with
modifications. See id.
9 See UNIF. DESERTION AND NONSUPPORT ACT § 1, 10 U.L.A. 1 (1910) (Act
withdrawn 1966) (stating that one who fails to provide support to a needy wife or
child can "still'be guilty of a crime"). The only provision that provided for payment
to dependents was UDNA § 7, 10 U.L.A. 77, which required correctional facility
officials to release to the inmate's dependents any money that the inmate earned
from hard labor.
100
See UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, Prefatory Note (1950
version), 9B U.L.A. 556 (1958) (asserting that a defect of the 1910 Act was that "it
made no reference to enforcement as against husbands and fathers who fled from the
state"); see also Tina M. Fielding, Note, The Uniform InterstateFamily Support Act: The
New URESA, 20 U. DAYTON L. REv. 425, 428 (1994) (explaining that "while UDNA
was an important step in enforcing support obligations, it did little to transfer money
from the obligor to the obligee and/or her children"). Unhappy with the absence of
civil interstate enforcement procedures from UDNA, New York legislators drafted and
passed the Uniform Support of Dependents Law ("USDL") in 1949. See 1949 N.Y.
Laws 807. This statute was eventually adopted in New York, Georgia, Illinois, and
Iowa. See Legislation, New York Uniform Support of Dependents Law-Its Operation to
Date, 30 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 309, 310 n.13 (1956). USDL, interestingly, was a civil
provision that required an individual to support not only a spouse and children, but
also certain close relatives, such as parents or grandchildren. See id. at 312 n.30. New
York never adopted URESA or RURESA, but rather modified its USDL to conform
with those evolving uniform acts. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 30, Practice Commentaries (McKinney 1988).
- 101See UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, Prefatory Note (1950
version), 9B U.L.A. 556 (1958).
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noncustodial parent "'fled from justice '"" ' 2 instead of merely
leaving the state for employment reasons, but it was also an
expensive endeavor-the legal and court fees involved in bringing
such an action made extradition a rarely pursued remedy l03 The
drafters of URESA also explained other problems with UDNA: "The
proceedings rendered reconciliation with the family improbable,
took him away from his job in the state to which he had fled, and by
branding him a convicted criminal lessened the probabilities of
gainful employment in the home state."1 ° 4 Realizing that a more
comprehensive solution was needed for the growing problem of
interstate support obligations," 5 the Commissioners began work
on a new uniform law in 1946.106
2. URESA and RURESA
By the early 1980s, every state had passed some version of
URESA, 10 7 approved by the Commissioners in 1950, or
0
approved by the Commissioners in 1968.1"' Both
RURESA,"'
of these laws provide primarily civil remedies that attempt to solve
some of the problems associated with the recognition and enforcement by one state of child support judgments from the courts of
other states."' Under these Acts, there are two primary methods
for the collection of support: (1) two-state proceedings and (2) the
registration of foreign orders (registration of an order in a state
other than the state that initially granted the order)."' Both of
0

1 2 Id.
103 See

id.
Id.
sSee id. (noting that $205 million was being spent annually by 1949 in aid to
families
in which the father was absent and not providing support to his family).
0
104
0

' 6 See COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL

CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE

FIFTY-FOURTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 278-79 (1944) (reporting to the Conference that
UDNA had been substantially changed by many states, a sign that the Act no longer
met the child support enforcement needs of many states, and recommending that
UDNA's status be changed to that of a Model Act).
107 9B U.L.A. 553 (1958).
108 9B U.L.A. 381 (1968).
10
9 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT, 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 229 (1992).
10See, e.g., UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, Prefatory Note
(1958 version), 9B U.L.A. 553 (1958) (stating that URESA's "purpose has been, and
is.... to provide by reciprocal legislation for the enforcement, across state lines, of
duties of support already existing").
. Two-state proceedings are discussed in REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT §§ 7-34, 9B U.L.A. 423-540 (1968), and registration is
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these procedures are designed to reduce the cost and delay 1 of
12
efforts by custodial parents to recover child support money.
The statutes also provide provisions encouraging extradition of
those debtors found to have violated criminal support laws,
although-these Acts do not themselves provide direct criminal
penalties for nonpayment.1
a. Two-State Proceedings
One way for a custodial parent to enforce a support obligation
is to initiate a two-state proceeding. 14 The custodial parent
begins a suit by filing a petition, in her or her child's home state
(called the "initiating state"), describing the circumstances surrounding the past-due support and providing all of the information she
has about the noncustodial parent's whereabouts." 5 The initiating
state's court ("the initiating court") must then determine whether
the petition "sets forth facts from which it may be determined that
the obligor owes a duty of support" and whether the courts of the
obligor's state of residence "may obtain jurisdiction of the obligor
or his property."1 6 If the initiating court answers these questions
affirmatively, then it must certify the petition to the courts of the
obligor's state of residence, the "responding state." 1 7
The
responding court then assumes complete jurisdiction over the
matter.1 ' The responding court has the obligation to notify the
discussed in REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT §§ 35-40, 9B

U.L.A.
540-50 (1968).
2
"

See REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, Prefatory Note,

9B U.L.A.
382 (1968).
1

13 See REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A.
416 (1968) (enabling state governors to demand the extradition from another state,
and to extradite from their own states, a person criminally charged for failure to
provide
support to any person).
14
1 See REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 11, 9B U.L.A.
440 (1968) (outlining the necessary procedures regarding filing and venue for
initiating a two-state proceeding).
"' The "initiating state" is defined in REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT
OF SUPPORT ACT § 2(d), 9B U.L.A. 402 (1968). The necessary contents of the petition
are described in REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 11, 9B
U.L.A. 440 (1968).
116 REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCALENFORCEMENTOFSUPPORTACT§ 14,9BU.L.A.450
(1968); see also William F. Fox, The Untform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 12
FAM. L.Q. 113, 120 (1978) (noting that the initiating state makes ajudgment akin to
a probable cause determination in a criminal case).
17 See REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 2(l), 9B U.L.A.
403 118
(1968) (defining "responding state").
See REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT §§ 18-19, 9B
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proper state agency, which will obtain jurisdiction over the obligor
and serve him with the complaint.1 19 After conducting a civil trial
under its own laws, the responding state must determine whether
a support obligation exists and, if such an obligation does exist, may
then order the payment of the past-due support as well as other
20
reimbursement. 1

b. Registrationof Orders
Alternatively, a custodial parent, who has already obtained a
child support order in her or her child's state of residence, may
seek to have that order registered and enforced in the noncustodial
parent's state of residence. 12 ' The custodial parent must first file
the existing order in the responding state. 122 Then, the responding state must notify the noncustodial parent and provide him with
the opportunity to petition to have the order vacated on grounds of
lack of personal jurisdiction or to have the order stayed pending
appeal in the state where the order was originally issued. 2 ' If the
noncustodial parent accepts the jurisdiction of the responding
court, either through active acceptance or through failure to
petition the court in a timely manner, the responding court can
enforce the order as if it were originally issued by that court.'2 4
If the order can be enforced just like any original order of the
responding court, the issue arises whether the responding court can
then modify the order just as it may modify any of its other
orders; 125 neither URESA nor RURESA provides a clear answer to
this question, and states have reached opposite conclusions

U.L.A.
461, 467 (1968) (describing the duties of the court in the responding state).
119
See REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 19, 9B U.L.A.
467 (1968).
120See REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 7, 9B U.L.A.
423 (1968) (describing which state's law is to be applied). The resulting order of
support is described in REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT

§ 24, 9B U.L.A. 487 (1968).
121 See REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT §§ 35-36, 9B

U.L.A. 540-41 (1968) (describing the procedures for the registration of foreign
support orders).
See REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 39(a), 9B

'2

U.L.A.
543 (1968).
12

3 See REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 40, 9B U.L.A.

546 (1968) (describing the effects of registration and enforcement procedures).
124See id.
125

See MARIANNE TAKAS, CHILD SUPPORT 73 (1985) (noting that child support

awards may be modified because of changed circumstances).
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regarding the extent of the responding court's authority to modify
126
orders.
3. UIFSA
UIFSA 2 7 is the newest, and most promising, uniform state law
to enter the battle against overdue support obligations. Since its
approval by the Commissioners in 1992, however, UIFSA has been
12
adopted, albeit in slightly modified form, by only twenty states. 1
UIFSA was designed to respond to new federal legislation that
affected child support laws to eliminate the problems of multiple
effective support orders that resulted from URESA proceedings in
different states and to streamline some of the procedures for
registration and modification of support orders. 129 Of all the
changes made by UIFSA, three are likely to create the most
significant improvements in interstate support enforcement: 30 (1)
the establishment of a uniform and broad long-arm jurisdiction
provision; 131 (2) the introduction of the principle of continuing
exclusive jurisdiction; 132 and (3) the limitation of the responding
court's ability to modify orders that come before it.133 While
these reforms promise to solve some of the problems that now
occur when one state's child support orders are sought to be
enforced by the courts of another state, UIFSA does nothing to
address the problems resulting from the current ineffective methods
of finding and punishing obligors who willfully choose not to pay.
These reforms neither strengthen the extradition powers of the
26

1 See REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT §

31, 9B U.L.A.
531 (1968) (exploring, in ambiguous language, whether the original support order
may be modified by a subsequent court's action); REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL
ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 30, 9B U.L.A. 529 (1968) (stating that no order of
support issued by a court acting as a responding court shall supersede other orders
of support); see also Fielding, supra note 100, at 442-44 (discussing courts' various
interpretations of the responding court's authority to modify orders).
127 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 229 (1992).
28
1 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT, Table ofJurisdictions, 9 U.L.A. pt.
I, at 229 (noting that, as of July 1, 1995, the Act has been adopted in Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin).
" See Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 230.
1
30 See id. at 231-33.
"IsSee § 201, 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 242.
132 See §§ 204-206, 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 246-48.
Iss See §§ 609-612, 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 278-82 (detailing the procedures for
registration and modification of support orders).
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states nor adopt uniform civil or criminal sanctions, thus ignoring
the importance of providing the states with the power to coerce
obligors to pay their obligations.
a. Long-Arm Jurisdiction
UIFSA provides, for the first time, a uniform long-arm jurisdictional statute in "proceeding[s] to establish, enforce, or modify a
support order or to determine parentage," which is as broad as the
Constitution permits.1 4 The comment to this section recognizes
that many states do not have specific domestic relations long-arm
statutes and also that some state statutes do not allow the exercise
ofjurisdiction to the maximum extent possible under the Constitu85
tion."
UIFSA will not only reduce confusion for interstate
litigants as to the relevant long-arm statute, but also will enable an
obligee to avoid a two-state proceeding altogether by simply
asserting jurisdiction over the out-of-state obligor in the obligee's
home state.
b.

ContinuingExclusive Jurisdiction

UIFSA also adopts the principle of continuing exclusive
jurisdiction from the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
("UCCJA"). 36 By providing that an order may be modified only
by the court that originally issued it, this principle makes valid only
one support order for each parent-child relationship at any given
time. 13 7
Thus, a responding court will be discouraged from
creating a new support order with different terms because the
responding court's order will be ineffective as long as the initiating
court retains its exclusive jurisdiction. UIFSA's drafters recognize

134 § 201, 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 242; see also Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604,
628 (1990) (holding that personal service of process within a state is sufficient to
support that state's exercise ofjurisdiction); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84,
101 (1978) (holding that the presence of a noncustodial parent's child within the state
does not support the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident,
noncustodial parent).
1is

See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 201 cmt., 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 242.

9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 115 (1968); see also infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text
(discussing the application of the continuing exclusive jurisdiction principle to
strengthen the enforceability of child support orders under the Full Faith and Credit
136

Clause). This provision is found at § 205 of UIFSA. See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY

SUPPORT AcT § 205, 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 246 (1992).
7
1s See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT §§ 204-206, 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 245-48
(1992).
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that there are many multiple orders in the United States today, and

although UIFSA does not include provisions designed to eliminate
any of the existing multiple orders, the drafters hope that strict
observance of the continuing exclusive jurisdiction rule will prevent
the promulgation of future multiple orders."'
c. Limitations on Modqifcation
Another consequence of the continuing exclusive jurisdiction
principle is that, except in some narrow factual situations, only one
state will be able to modify existing orders at any given time.'3 9
Once a state obtains continuing exclusive jurisdiction over an order,
another state can only modify that order (1) if none of the parties
(including the child, the individual obligee, and the obligor) remain
in the first state or (2) if all the parties file written consents in the
first state to transfer continuing exclusive jurisdiction to the other
state. 140 The rather common practice of support order modificadon under URESA and RURESA will be eliminated under UIFSA,
and UIFSA's drafters hope that the doctrine of continuing exclusive
jurisdiction will keep both custodial and noncustodial parents from
forum shopping for a state whose substantive child support law
41
favors their claim'
B. The Problems with State Enforcement Efforts
1. Legal Problems
a. The Full Faith and Credit Clause
The basic problem facing custodial parents who try to enforce
child support orders against noncustodial parents who live in
different states is that a state court only has authority over
those people within its jurisdiction, which is defined by the

" See § 204 cmt., 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 245 (noting the importance of creating a

procedure to "eliminate the multiple orders so common under RURESA and
URESA"); Fielding, supra note 100, at 459 (asserting that the policy of continuing
exclusive jurisdiction "furthers the goal of single orders").
139 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT §§ 609-612, 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 278-82

(1992).
14

See § 611(a), 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 279.
§ 611 cmt., 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 280 (stating that UIFSA is aimed at eliminating
the problems that occur when "[t]ribunals in other states... assume jurisdiction to
enter new orders or to modify an out-of-state support order").
141See
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For example, when an
state's long-arm jurisdiction statute."'
order for child support is entered against a noncustodial parent
in the courts of state A, and the noncustodial parent is a citizen
of State B, the courts of state A will have no direct means of
enforcing their order if the long-arm statute does not provide
for jurisdiction over the noncustodial parent. As a result, the
custodial parent must seek to register the order of state A in
the courts of state B. 143 This process might appear to be relatively
simple, since the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United
States Constitution provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall
be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
Judicial Proceedings of every other State." 144 In fact, the process is quite difficult, for the Full Faith and Credit Clause only
applies to final and unmodifiable judgments. 145 By their nature,
child support orders are forward-looking toward the possibility of
146
changed circumstances and are, thus, inherently modifiable.
Therefore, the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not necessarily
apply to child support judgments.
In order to emphasize the importance of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause in situations involving the enforcement of overdue
child support obligations, Congress passed the Full Faith and
Credit for Child Support Orders Act in 1994.147 This Act was an
attempt to make child support orders more enforceable once
the support payments became overdue, by making the orders less
modifiable. 148 Congress specifically found that the jurisdictional
limits of state law "lead to the excessive relitigation of cases and
to the establishment of conflicting orders by the courts of vari2

14

See

DAVID

CRUMP ET AL.,

CASES AND

MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE

§ 2.02(B)(3), at 82 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the various ways that states define their
extraterritorial jurisdiction).
143 See supra part II.A.2.b (discussing the registration of orders).
4 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
141 See Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 17 (1910) (holding that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause protects the right to periodic alimony payments once' this right
"becomes absolute and vested," a condition that requires that "the right to demand
and receive" such payments must not be "discretionary with the court which rendered
the decree").
141 See, e.g., Graham v. Graham, 597 A.2d 355, 357-58 (D.C. 1991) (holding that
changes in a parent's lifestyle and income justify the modification of child support
orders).
147 The Act, now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (1994), became law on October 20,
1994. See Pub. L. No. 103-383, § 3(a), 108 Stat. 4063, 4064-66 (1994).
141 See Pub. L. No. 103-383, § 2, 108 Stat. 4063, 4063-64 (1994) (explaining the
purposes of the Act).
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ous jurisdictions, resulting in confusion, waste ofjudicial resources,
disrespect for the courts, and a diminution of public confidence in
the rule of law."149 The Act's goal was achieved through adoption
of the continuing exclusive jurisdiction approach of UCCJA, which
states that only one state, the child's "home state," may act
to modify a child custody award. 50 As a result, child support
judgments are more likely to be enforced under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause because they are unmodifiable except by the court
that has continuing exclusive jurisdiction over them. 151 This
Federal Act, however, cannot solve the problem that is created by
some state laws that do not declare child support orders to be
final when they become due, but rather declare them to be final
when, and if, the court later enters judgment on a past-due
amount. 152

149

Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, Pub. L. No. 103-383,

§ 2(a)(3)(E), 108 Stat. 4063, 4064 (1994). It could be argued that the passage of this
Act was beyond the scope of Congress's authority in the area of state-created child
support orders. Critics of the CSRA could say that Congress, in effect, assumes
jurisdiction through this Act over conflicting state orders and decides which one
should be enforced. Federal involvement on this scale has been rejected in other full
faith and credit situations. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 187
(1988) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1738B, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, does
not create a federal cause ofaction to determine which state order is valid when there
are conflicting state orders).
150 See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODYJURISDICTION ACT § 3, 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 143 (1968)
(establishing a system that gives continuing exclusive jurisdiction over a child's
custody to a court of one state and requires other state courts to yield to that court's
jurisdiction unless specific requirements are met). UCCJA has been adopted by all
50 states, as well as by the District of Columbia. See Table ofJurisdictions, 9 U.L.A.
pt. I, at 115.
151See 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(e) (1994).
52
1 See LENOREJ. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 436-37 app.
C (1985) (listing the jurisdictions where past-due child support awards may be
modified: Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and Washington, D.C.). These
states' laws require a custodial parent to take an extra step in the already timeconsuming process of attempting to enforce a child support judgment. In these
states, the parent must obtain a final judgment on the past-due amount from the state
court in order for the support order to be final and enforceable. See 2 MARYGOLD
S. MELLI ET AL., ALIMONY, CHILD SUPPORT, COUNSEL FEES: AWARD, MODIFICATION
& ENFORCEMENT § 18.06[2], at 18-62 to 18-64 (1992).
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b. Delay of Adoption
Although the innovations of UIFSA promise to alleviate some of
the problems faced by the states who were operating under the

URESA and RURESA systems, these improvements will take some
time to become effective. One reason for the delay in improvement
is simply that UIFSA has yet to be universally adopted. More than
three years after it was approved by the American Bar Association
and the Commissioners, only thirty percent of American jurisdictions had adopted it. 5 This delay on the part of state legislatures
may simply be the result of busy state dockets, but it may also be an
indication that a majority of states do not agree with the policies
advanced by UIFSA. Even if UIFSA is eventually adopted by all
United States jurisdictions, it may not be enacted in exactly the
same form, thus frustrating some of the benefits of a uniform law.
Although they are discouraged from substantially changing the
provisions of uniform acts,154 state legislatures often do so anyway.' 5-5 Of the twenty states that have adopted UIFSA to date,
four have made changes that have more than a de minimis
effect.'
Also, because UIFSA is enacted as state law, and as such
may not be conclusively construed by the federal courts,5 7 each
.5.
See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
"4 See COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1993-94 REFERENCE BOOK 3

(noting that it is the Conference's goal to alleviate problems created by the
nonuniformity in state law when transactions, services, and people cross state lines);
see also REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 41, 9B U.L.A.
550 (1968) (explaining that this "Act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it").
155For example, Arkansas, Florida, California, Georgia, Illinois, Ohio, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, and Virginia all substantially modified RURESA upon
adoption. See REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, General
Statutory Notes, 9B U.L.A. 383 (1968).
15 See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1721 to 12-1756 (1994 & Supp. 1995)
(adopting UIFSA, but failing to repeal RURESA, so that RURESA can be used when
Arizona receives a case from an initiating state that has not adopted UIFSA); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-5-101 to 14-5-1007 (West Supp. 1994) (enacting a different
part 10, §§ 14-5-1001 to 14-5-1006); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518C.101 to 518C.902
(West Supp. 1995) (adding a new section in 518C.901 1); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-960
to 20-7-1170 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1994) (adding a new section regarding
parentage,. § 20-7-1158); see also UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT, General
Statutory Note, 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 233 (1992) (explaining that "[w]hile the Arizona act
is a substantial adoption of the major provisions of the Uniform Act, it departs from
the official text in such manner that the various instances of substitution, omission
and additional matter cannot be clearly indicated by statutory notes").
157 See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE

FEDERAL SYSTEM 789-91 (3d ed. 1988) (explaining that federal courts must look to
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state's courts may choose to interpret its provisions in slightly
different ways that may be substantial enough to cause confusion to
participants in multistate proceedings.
c. JurisdictionalProblems

One other procedural problem with leaving child support
enforcement to the states, until UIFSA takes effect everywhere, is
that nonuniform long-arm jurisdictional statutes provide states with
questionable jurisdiction over out-of-state obligors. Even if the
custodial parent may resort to a two-state proceeding under
RURESA, 5 8 that proceeding will be more time-consuming and
expensive than if the custodial parent was able to sue on the
support obligation in her own state. 159 Moreover, during the time

spent in litigation, the custodial parent will not receive the support
due to her child."' 0 Custodial parents who live in states that lack
minimum contacts with the noncustodial parent1 6' are particularly
vulnerable to delayed enforcement of support orders. 162 This was

lower state courts' interpretations of state law when the state's highest court has not
spoken to the state law issue in question).
" See supra part II.A.2.a.
159 See MARK S. GURALNICK, INTERSTATE CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION 1-2 (1993)
(discussing the time-consuming aspects of interstate custody litigation that also occur
in interstate support litigation).
160 Child support obligations arise only when a court enters an order specifying
the amount to be paid, see In re Marriage of Klein, 671 P.2d 1345, 1348 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1983), but some states may allow support to be awarded retroactively to the date
of the parents' separation, see Crabtree v. Crabtree, 651 P.2d 29, 31-32 (Mont. 1982).
Although not within the scope of this Comment, there is a related problem that the
jurisdictional requirements for child custody and child support cases may be different.
Because parents may be reluctant to proceed simultaneously in different states, they
may face difficulty in finding a convenient state that will exercise jurisdiction over
both issues. See Linda M. DeMelis, Note, Interstate Child Custody and the Parental
KidnappingPreventionAct: The ContinuingSearchforaNationalStandard,45 HASTINGS
L.J. 1329, 1352-53 (1994).
161The doctrine of minimum contacts was articulated in International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (describing the constitutionally permissible
minimum contacts that a state court must have in order to assertjurisdiction over a
nonresident of the state as dependent upon the "quality and nature of the activity");
cf. E.R. Lanier, Connecting Defendant's Contact and Plaintiff's Claim: The Doctrine of
Specific Jurisdictionand the Matrimonial Domicile Provisions of the Georgia Long-Arm
Statute, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 303, 310-15 (1995) (analyzing the necessary degree of
connection between a plaintiff's claim and a defendant's contacts under the Georgia
long-arm statute for family relations issues).
62
' See Carol S. Bruch, Statutoty Reform of Constitutional Doctrine: Fitting
International Shoe to Family Law, 28 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1047, 1054 (1995); see also
Heather M. Lammers, Note, Murphy v. Basile: Successful Abandonment By theJudicial
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the situation in Kulko v. Superior Court,' in which the United
States Supreme Court held that a California court could not assert
jurisdiction over a nonresident noncustodial father who refused to
her
pay child support, even though the child lived in California with
64
mother under an agreement that the father had approved.'

As an alternative to making these parents depend upon RURESA
for a remedy, it has been suggested that state legislatures accept the
invitation of the Supreme Court in Kulko to broaden the scope of

their jurisdictional authority by making specific findings about the
importance of allowing a child's home state to have jurisdiction over
The
matters concerning that child's support and custody.'6 5
Clinton Administration supported a child-based jurisdictional

standard in its 1994 proposed changes to welfare. 166 The proposal
would have required states, as a condition of their AFDC funding,
to adopt UIFSA, amended to establish the presumption that a state
67

has jurisdiction over both parents if the child is a state resident.

The criminal provisions of the CSRA would provide an enforce-

ment mechanism that is not subject to dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 16 Since relief under the statute is pursued in
federal court 169 and the operation of federal law is not limited by
state lines, 170 the question is reduced to which federal district

System of a Mother Asserting In PersonamJurisdictionAgainst a Nonresident Putative
Father, 40 S.D. L. REv. 546, 546 (1995) (arguing that the South Dakota Supreme
Court's refusal to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident putative father when the
child lived in South Dakota was, in effect, judicial encouragement to the father not
to pay child support).
'

436 U.S. 84 (1978).

See id. at 87-88 (explaining that the father "bought his daughter a one-way
plane ticket" to California and she left, "taking her clothing with her"). The Court
later recharacterized the father's act as "connot[ing] no intent to obtain or expectancy
of receiving a corresponding benefit in [California]." Id. at 101. The Court ignored
the reality that the daughter would receive many benefits from the State of California
and that the father intended for her to receive those benefits. See id. at 89.
165See Bruch, supra note 162, at 1054-56 (urging a stronger legislative response to
Kulko and arguing that if owning a piece of land is enough to give the state
containing the land jurisdiction over a nonresident landowner in a suit concerning
an accident on that land, then a child's presence in a state should be sufficient to give
that state jurisdiction over a nonresident parent in a suit concerning the survival and
maintenance of the child).
"6See id. at 1057 n.43.
167 See id.

6 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (providing federal courts with jurisdiction over
cases "arising under" federal law).
169 See id.
70

The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that federal law is

applicable in every state. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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court will have proper venue to hear the case. Also, since the
sanctions offered by the CSRA are criminal, the government, and
not the custodial parent, would bear the substantial costs of
litigation required to secure payment of the unmet support
1
obligation.' '
2. Practical Problems
One of the most obvious problems, and the most impervious to
legal solution, faced by the custodial parent seeking to enforce a
support order is the difficulty involved in finding a noncustodial
parent who does not want to be located. 72 Unless the custodial
parent has the resources to employ an investigating service, which
is especially unlikely for custodial parents who receive public
assistance, the custodial parent must rely on information provided
by the noncustodial parent or his family and acquaintances to
determine his whereabouts. Even if the noncustodial parent is
eventually located, and the court of his state exercises jurisdiction
that
over him, it still may be difficult to discover any financial assets
173
award.
support
child
a
satisfy
or
calculate
may be used to
Custodial parents who receive AFDC may turn to their state
Title IV-D agency for free assistance in enforcing their child support
awards, and other custodial parents may invoke state aid for a
nominal fee. 174 Title IV-D agencies, although mandated by the
federal government, are administered by the states under a set of
administrative regulations promulgated by the Office of Child
Support Enforcement ("OCSE"), a division of the Department of
Health and Human Services. 175 Although these agencies seem
171

See 1 BARRY H. FRANK ET AL., ALIMONY, CHILD SUPPORT, COUNSEL FEES:
AWARD, MODIFICATION & ENFORCEMENT § 11.02[2], at 11-19 (1992) ("[Mlaking

nonsupport a crime has the advantage of providing the nonsupported child with the
help of the public prosecutor in bringing an action and in searching out the
defaulting parent.").
'7 See 140 CONG. REC. S7269, S7356 (daily ed. June 21, 1994) (Work and
Responsibility Act of 1994 fact sheet).
'73 See CURALNICK, supra note 159, at 2 (noting that interstate child custody
litigation, which is procedurally similar to child support litigation, is "an imperfect
m6lange ofcomplaints... timed strategically to vest, or divest, parties ofjurisdiction;
ex parte appearances;... costly interstate travel;... conflicting court orders; and the
hide-and-seek relationship between parents and children on the move").
'4 See supra note 36 and accompanying text; see also 42 U.S.C. § 654(6) (1994)
(setting forth the procedure by which non-AFDC eligible parents may obtain state
aid).
I- See 45 C.F.R. §§ 301-307 (1995).
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effective in theory, they are almost universally described as failures,
perhaps because too many parents attempt to take advantage of
them. 7 ' One scholar commented, "[t]he system was thwarted by
even more bureaucracy, thick practice manuals, a case overload
growing at an alarming rate, and technicalities. The state child
support agencies were underfunded and understaffed to handle the
rapidly increasing volume of cases." 177 The amendments to the
OCSE system in 1984, 1986, and 1988 had little substantive effect
78
on the ineffectiveness of Title IV-D agencies in the states.'
According to General Accounting Office estimates, the average fulltime caseworker in a state Title IV-D agency handles over 1000 cases
1 79
at the same time.
Another impediment .to the collection of child support debt
exists for those custodial parents who have been successful in
locating the noncustodial parent and bringing him to court. There
is a feeling among many custodial parents thatjudges are "unsympathetic and impatient with their request[s]. "8 0 In testimony before
Congress in 1983, the president of the Organization for the
Enforcement of Child Support ("OECS") stated that "[i]t is easy for
a parent who is in arrears to make a rather lame excuse in front of
a lenient judge and be let off with a warning."'' Although these
reports of widespread dissatisfaction are somewhat dated, it is
unlikely that all of those attitudes would have been eradicated from
the system in the space of ten years.
A final uncertainty in the enforcement process is the possible
modification of awards because of different standards for calculating

the amount of child support owed.

As yet, there are no federal

17

6 But see TAKAS, supra note 125, at 7 (noting that state Title IV-D offices will

continue to improve their services and may be more effective at collecting support
than a private attorney).
177 Calhoun, supra note 31, at 931 (citations omitted).
78
See Rhonda McMillion, Child Care: CongressSeeks StrongerInterstate Child Support

System, 79 A.B.A. J., Aug. 1993, at 107, 107 (noting that Title IV-D's flexibility in
allowing differences between state procedures has caused difficulty in interstate
cases); Harry B. O'Donnell IV, Note, Title lof the FamilySupport Act of 1988-The Quest
for Effective National Child Support Enforcement Continues, 29 J. FAM. L. 149, 154-55
(1990) (noting that Title IV-D agencies did not perform as well as expected).
79

' See Margaret C. Haynes, Child Support and the Courts in the Year 2000, 17 AM.

J. TRIAL ADvoc. 693, 695 (1994) (discussing the challenges facing state agencies that
have increasing caseloads and no corresponding increase in their budgets).

180 Weitzman, supra note 30, at 267.
181Child Support Enforcement Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Public

Assistance and Unemployment Compensationof the House Comm. on Ways andMeans, 98th

Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1983) (statement of Elaine M. Fromm, President, OECS).
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amounts, so states differ on
guidelines on the calculation of support
18 2
calculations.
their
make
they
how
C. The Benefits of FederalLegislation and a Description of
Recent FederalLaws Affecting Enforcement
8 have been helpful in
The criminal provisions of the CSRA"'
solving all of the problems with state enforcement. First, in a
federal criminal prosecution, the Department of Justice's investigative resources are added to those of overburdened state Title IV-D
agencies.' 84 Although the federal government is unable to assist
in every interstate case, its involvement dramatically increases the
likelihood of successfully prosecuting the most serious cases; after
less than a year of prosecutions under the statute, federal officials
have commenced suits to recover well over one million dollars of
unpaid child support."' The possibility of federal prosecution
may also act as a strong incentive for obligors to become current on
large overdue child support obligations. The Department ofJustice
has committed itself to "aggressive investigation and prosecution"
targeted at the most egregious violators, and hopes to prosecute
about 200 new cases per year.'8 6 While these cases represent only
a fraction of the millions of parents who fail to pay child support,
they will increase the attention given to the child support problem
and will act as a reminder that evading child support payments is a
serious matter that can no longer be so easily avoided. The
increasedattention and devotion of resources to child support cases

2 See Haynes,supra note 179, at 700-03 (explaining the goals and purposes of the
National Child Support Guidelines Commission).
's' See, e.g., supranote 69 (setting out one criminal provision, § 228, of the CSRA).
184When the government prosecutes a criminal case, it may often be obligated to
pay the expenses associated with investigation and litigation. See FED. R. CRIM. P.

15(c).

I' From the reported cases alone, it is clear that the government's claims have
approached the million dollar mark. Jeffrey Nichols alone owes over half a million
dollars. See Sixty Minutes, supranote 1. Patrick Law owes $140,000. See DeadbeatDad,
supra note 15, at A3. Steven Parker owes over $25,000. See United States v. Parker,
911 F. Supp. 830, 832 (E.D. Pa. 1995). Donald Schroeder owes approximately
$24,000. See United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360, 362 (D. Ariz. 1995). Mark
Hopper is at least $5335 in arrears, although he may owe as much as $24,000. See
United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389, 391 (S.D. Ind. 1995). Allan Mussari owes
$40,385. See United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360, 1361 (D. Ariz. 1995). The
published opinions do not indicate the amounts owed by Samuel Sage,John Kegel,
Ricky Hampshire, James Murphy, or Keith Bailey.
85
" DeadbeatDad Enforcement: DOjon Tightrope, DEP'TJUST. ALERT,Jan. 2-16, 1995,
at 2, 2 [hereinafter Deadbeat Dad Enforcement].
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at the federal level will hopefully encourage state courtjudges to be
less lenient in their dealings with child support debtors.
In the last five years, Congress has focused more extensively on
the growing problem of child support enforcement and its impact
on federal and state welfare expenditures.
Several pieces of
proposed and enacted federal legislation describe innovative
approaches to making the enforcement process less time-consuming,
less burdensome, and more effective.1 17 But the CSRA, by attaching criminal penalties to the failure to pay support obligations, is
indicative of Congress's strengthened resolve to combat the growing
balance of unpaid support. 8 ' The CSRA is only one part of a
group of laws designed to aid states in their ability to enforce child
support obligations in other states.'
When added to the arsenal
of these other federal laws, the criminal provisions of the CSRA will
provide an effective deterrent to nonpayment. Without the CSRA,
the noncustodial parent is obligated to pay only the overdue amount
of support and potentially some accrued interest, but is not subject
to punitive sanctions."' Therefore, there are no additional incentives for the noncustodial parent to pay on time if all he will
eventually pay is the amount due. In combination, the criminal
provisions of the CSRA and the other federal laws will likely
increase the percentage of orders that are enforced.'
Arguably, the most significant reforms are those associated with
tax refund withholding and wage garnishment.
The Internal
Revenue Service has been withholding federal tax refunds from
nonsupporting parents for fourteen years, 19 2 and the 1984 amendments to Title IV-D enable state tax refunds to be similarly with187 See infra notes 192-205 and accompanying text.
18 See generally H.R. REP. No. 771, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1992) (imposing a
.criminal penalty for flight to avoid payment of arrearages in child support").
189Even without the criminal provisions of the CSRA, federal involvement in
interstate support enforcement would be substantial; most federal involvement is in
the administration of state agencies operating under the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare. See supra notes 35-36, 175-79 and accompanying text
(discussing the role of state agencies established by Title IV-D of the Social Security
Act).
190 See IRA M. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 395 (1986)

(explaining that in civil contempt cases, the obligor may avoid punishment simply by
paying his accrued debt).
19'See Haynes, supra note 179, at 718 (concluding that recent federal and state

legislation will make the child support enforcement system more efficient).
'9 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. XXIII,
§ 2331(a), 95 Stat. 357, 860-61 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 664 (1994)).
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held.193 The federal government requires the states, as a condition of their AFDC funding, to establish procedures by which "any
refund of State income tax which would otherwise be payable to an
absent parent will be reduced . .. by the amount of any overdue
support." 194 These and later amendments also require states to
allow income-withholding so that support payments can be directly
deducted from the obligor's income. 95 Congress found that
income-withholding provisions are among the "most effective,
efficient and low-cost techniques for bringing child support
obligations into paying status and keeping them there" because
"[d]educting current support obligations from paychecks keeps
support payments current without any effort on the part of the
obligor and insures that the support obligation will come before
other expenditures."' 9 6
The Child Support Economic Security Act of 1993,1 7 which
was stalled in committee and never passed by the 103rd Congress,
would have made all income (including lottery winnings, insurance
policy benefits, and court-awarded judgments, but not public
assistance) subject to withholding for child support. 9 ' Also, the
bill would have required that states deny all professional licenses to
those more than $1000 in arrears on support payments who have
not made a "good faith effort" to pay their debt.'99 Furthermore,
the bill would have required reporting of past-due child support
obligations to consumer reporting agencies for individuals with
overdue amounts in excess of the monthly support payment
owed. 0 0 Perhaps most significantly, the bill would have imposed
deadlines for interstate cases on state enforcement agencies to
20 1
prevent the cases from dragging on indefinitely.
The Interstate Child Support Enforcement Act, 2 2 which was
introduced in 1993 and also stalled in committee, would have
required the states to adopt UIFSA, primarily because of its
continuing exclusive jurisdiction principle. 20 ' Additionally, the
See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(3)(A) (1994).
"Id.
"9

See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(8) (1994).

H.R. REP. No. 527, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. IV, at 31 (1983).
197H.R. 915, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
19 See id. § 104.
1- See id. § 105.
2- See id. § 106.
-1 See id. § 111.
2 H.R. 1600, 103d Cong.,.Ist Sess. (1993); S. 689, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
20NSee H.R. 1600, § 424; S. 689, § 424.
196
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bill would have strengthened the state income withholding provisions by changing the W-4 income tax withholding form to require
new employees to reveal existing support obligations.1 4 It also
would have expanded the use of the Federal Parent Locator System,
a set of databases that maintain records of child support orders and
20 5
parents' locations.
Thus, several weapons in the proposed federal arsenal of child
support devices were never passed by Congress, and the problems
of children living without parental support remains. The criminal
provisions of the CSRA should be seen as a major facet of the
federal initiative against children living in poverty. That initiative
may be jeopardized if the criminal provisions are struck down as
being constitutionally infirm.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE
A. The Commerce Clause Problem
In analyzing how Lopez applies to the criminal provisions of the
CSRA, the federal district courts have focused primarily on four
aspects of the Lopez decision: (1) the Court's discussion of the
absence of a jurisdictional element; (2) the nature of the activity
prohibited; (3) the legislative history showing congressional purpose
in creating a federal criminal statute; and (4) the doctrines of
federalism and comity that underlie the conflict between state and
federal authority.2 6 Four courts utilized these elements to reach
the conclusion that § 228 of the CSRA was unconstitutional, while
five courts reached the opposite conclusion.2 7 In the rash of
litigation that has sprung up after Lopez over the constitutionality of
a variety of federal criminal statutes, these elements have been at
the center of the courts' analyses.20 ' Although no circuit court has
yet dealt with the question of § 228's constitutionality, several
circuits have declined to extend the reasoning of Lopez and have
204 See H.R. 1600, § 402(a)(2).
2- See id. §§ 101, 402.
'o See generally United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding that a
provision of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 is invalid as beyond Congress's
Commerce Clause power).
2' See supra part I.B (discussing the federal district court split).
21 See, e.g., United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 525-28 (9th Cir. 1995)
(analyzing the requirements ofajurisdictional element, an effect on commerce, and
concerns about federalism in upholding the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i),
as being constitutional and within Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause).

INTERSTATE CHILD SUPPORT

1501

upheld federal statutes criminalizing arson, carjacking, and the
possession of firearms." 9 In the October 1995 term, the Supreme
Court refused to reevaluate its Lopez analysis in light of these
challenges, althoughJustice Thomas has indicated a desire to extend
its reasoning.2 1
The following analysis examines in detail each
contested element of the Lopez holding.
1. Jurisdictional Elements
The Lopez Court explained that one of the fundamental
problems with § 9 22(q) of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990
("§ 922(q)") 211 was that it contained "no jurisdictional element
which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm
possession in question affects interstate commerce. 212 In further
explaining what it meant by a jurisdictional element, the Court
analogized to United States v. Bass,2"' wherein the Court held that
in order to convict a person under a statute that made it a crime for
a felon to possess a firearm that is "in commerce or affecting
commerce, 214 the government must specifically prove an "additional nexus to interstate commerce." 215 The Lopez Court struck

down § 9 22(q) because it contained no specific language mandating
a connection between the possessed firearm and movement in
216

interstate commerce.
In contrast to the statute at issue in Lopez, § 228(a) of the CSRA
specifically states that an interstate connection must exist by limiting
the federal offense to cases where the support obligation is "with

0 See United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1213-14 (6th Cir. 1995) (upholding
the federal arson statute), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 795 (1996); United States v. Bishop,
66 F.3d 569, 576 (3d Cir.) (upholding the federal carjacking statute), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 681 (1995); United States v. Rankin, 64 F.3d 338, 339 (8th Cir.) (upholding the
federal possession of weapons statute), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 577 (1995); United
States v. Dodge, 61 F.3d 142, 145 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 428 (1995).
210 In dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Leslie Salt Co. v. United States,
55 F. 3d 1388 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 407 (1995),Justice Thomas indicated
that he would like to revisit the Lopez analysis. See Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 116
S. Ct. 407, 409 (1995).
9
211 18 U.S.C. § 22(q) (1994).
212 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995).
213

404 U.S. 336 (1971).

Id. at 337 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a), which now exists in modified form as 18
U.S.C. § 9 22(g) (1994)).
215 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (emphasis added).
216 See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994) (making it a federal crime "for
any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or
has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone").
214
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respect to a child who resides in another State."2 7 The main
point of contention between the lower courts is whether this
language provides the additional nexus to interstate commerce that
Lopez requires.2 8 The courts that found the statute to be constitutional agree that even though § 228 does not specifically state that
interstate commerce must be affected, the limitation of the statute
to interstate cases is sufficient to ensure that only cases that affect
the redistribution of financial assets between states will be covered. 2 " The requirement that the nonsupporting parent and the
child live in different states will prevent the federal government
from interfering in the domestic relations concerns of one state,
while invoking federal aid to solve enforcement problems that occur
because of the jurisdictional limits on state authority.220
In
comparison to the jurisdictional elements held to be sufficient by
other courts interpreting Lopez, the interstate requirement of § 228
seems clearly sufficient. 2 1
The courts finding § 228 unconstitutional attacked the overbreadth of the interstate requirement, arguing that because
Congress's purpose was to "'impose a criminal penalty forflight to
avoid payment of arrearages in child support,'" the jurisdictional
element is invalid because it is not narrowly tailored to meet those
goals. 222 This logic is difficult to follow because it implicitly

217

18 U.S.C. § 228(a) (1994).

218 See

Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
e.g., United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84, 91-92 (D. Conn. 1995)
(asserting that "[b]y limiting regulation to interstate payments only a nexus to
interstate commerce is assured," because the redirection of money across state lines
also redirects the interstate market demand for goods).
'oSee United States v. Kegel, No. 95-300-CR-T-21(E), 1996 WL 69725, at *2 (M.D.
Fla. Feb. 13, 1996); United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389, 393 (S.D. Ind. 1995);
United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614, 616 (W.D. Va. 1995); United States v.
Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327, 1329 (D. Kan. 1995).
22 See United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1521 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding 18
U.S.C. § 922(o), even though the statute's only jurisdictional basis for making ita
crime for any person to transfer or possess a machine gun was premised upon the
legislative history of the Act, which established that machine guns "by their nature are
'a commodity... transferred across state lines for profit'" (quoting United States v.
Hunter, 843 F. Supp. 235, 249 (E.D. Mich. 1994))); United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d
1456, 1461-62 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding the validity of thejurisdictional element of
18 U.S.C. § 9 22(g)(1), which required the possession of a firearm in or affecting
commerce); United States v. Brown, 893 F. Supp. 11, 12 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (same); cf.
United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 528 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
jurisdictional element of the federal arson statute is not satisfied by a private
residence whose only connection to interstate commerce is that it receives gas that
comes from out of state).
' United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360, 1364 (D. Ariz. 1995) (quoting H.R.
219 See,
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invokes the requirements of heightened scrutiny analysis 22 for

infringements of the right to interstate travel. Even assuming that
the Schroederand Mussari courts are arguing that § 228 is unconstitutional because it interferes with the right to interstate travel and
is not narrowly tailored to achieve its objective, 224 and is not

simply confusing a narrow-tailoring test with the Lopez requirement
of an additional nexus to interstate commerce, 225 this logic remains

unpersuasive. The compelling governmental interest sought to be
advanced by the statute is the payment of delinquent child support
obligations. Because state enforcement has been shown to be
ineffective in all interstate cases, even where the interstate tie has
been created by the movement of the custodial parent, 226 the
potential for federal intervention in all interstate cases is necessary
to achieve the stated objective. Otherwise, the custodial parent's
right to interstate travel would be burdened if her ability to collect

REP. No. 771, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1992)); United States v. Schroeder, 894 F.
Supp. 360, 365 (D. Ariz. 1995) (same).
" Heightened scrutiny is the test applied to judge the constitutionality of
legislation that burdens fundamental rights or is based on suspect classifications. See
TRIBE, supra note 62, § 16-6, at 1451. When strict scrutiny is applied, the classification will be upheld only if it is necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest. See id. § 16-7, at 1454. The legislation must be narrowly tailored to meet
its stated objective. See, e.g., Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505, 508
(1989) (holding Richmond's set-aside program for minority contractors to be
unconstitutional because the city "failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in
apportioning public contracting opportunities on the basis of race" and failed to show
that the program was "narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of prior discrimination").
" When legislation conditions the award of benefits or the deprivation of rights
based on factors that interfere with a United States citizen's right to travel or move
interstate, the strict scrutiny requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause are invoked. See TRIBE, supra note 62, § 16-8, at 1455. Although
the Constitution does not specifically mention the right to interstate travel, some
cases have held that it is a fundamental right deserving of strict scrutiny protection.
See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634-38 (1969) (holding that a one-year
residency requirement for the receipt of welfare violates the constitutional right to
travel from state to state and must be judged by strict scrutiny standards). Other
cases have described the right to interstate travel as one of the "privileges and
immunities" of U.S. citizenship that is protected against state interference by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179,200 (1973) (striking down the residency requirement of a Georgia abortion
statute because it violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2).
sSee United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995).
22 Seesupra part II.B; cf. United States v. Kegel, No. 95-300-CR-T-21(E), 1996 WL
69725, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 1996) (finding that as long as the parents are in
different states and the obligor-parent fails to make support payments, the concerns
addressed by the CSRA are raised, regardless of the motivations that prompted either
parent to move out of state).
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child support were to be hampered by her decision to move to a
different state. 227 Moreover, the federal law is not invoked merely
by a child support obligor's decision to move interstate; he must
also willfully engage in the culpable behavior of failing to pay his
child support debts.
Even if the Schroeder and Mussari courts are correct in stating
that the language of the statute reaches more parents than Congress
intended because of its failure to differentiate situations where the
custodial parent moves interstate, 228 that argument does not affect
the Lopez jurisdictional requirement issue,-for Congress did require
an interstate connection for each case that will be prosecuted under
§ 228.229 Additionally, the Schroeder and Mussari courts seem to
engage in selective reading of the statute's legislative history by
citing the purpose identified at the beginning of the Judiciary
Committee's report,230 but ignoring the more detailed explanation
of the statute's purpose and desired effect.231 The Committee's
report focuses not on the need to punish the nonsupporting
parent's flight, but instead on the need to punish those who fail to
pay their support obligations. It recognizes that interstate collection
poses many procedural obstacles to effective collection, especially
for the "'hard core' group of parents who flagrantly refuse to
232
pay."
The Schroeder and Miusari courts also invoke a slippery slope
argument to protest that allowing the jurisdictional element in § 228
to stand "would result in unlimited Congressional power to
regulate" without regard for subjects reserved for state control. 33

Cf United States v. Kegel, No. 95-300-CR-T-21(E), 1996 WL 69725, at *3 (M.D.
Fla. Feb. 13, 1996) ("However, the 'innocent' relocation to a different jurisdiction is
no less an injurious use of the channels of interstate commerce than the intentional
flight to avoid payment of child support obligations .... ").
22' See United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360, 1364 (D. Ariz. 1995) (noting
that, despite § 228's stated purpose of penalizing a parent's flight to avoid payment,
the law nonetheless has "no intent to flee requirement" and applies broadly to "any
parent who lives in a state different from the child," regardless of which parent
created this difference); United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360, 365 (D. Ariz.
1995) (same).

See 18 U.S.C. § 228(a) (1994) (emphasizing that the statute is violated only
when an obligation is owed to "a child who resides in another State").
. ' See Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1364 (stating that "the CSRA's legislative
history
specifically states that the purpose 6f[§ 228] is to 'impose a criminal penalty forflight
to avoid payment of arrearages in child support'" (quoting H.R. REP. No. 771, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1992))); Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 365 (same).
221 See H.R. REP. No. 771, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1992).
212 Id. at 6.
2
Schroeder,894 F. Supp. 360, 365 (D. Ariz. 1995); see also Mussari, 894 F. Supp.
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This argument is not about whether Congress specified a necessary
interstate connection in this particular statute, but touches on a
more fundamental debate about whether the payment or nonpayment of child support can be considered commerce at all. s
Although the question ofjurisdiction is different from the question
of what constitutes commerce, the definition of a jurisdictional.
element in Lopez invokes arguments about what constitutes
commerce by using the word commerce. 215 As recognized by the
Parker court, a jurisdictional element ensuring that the statute
affects interstate commerce is not satisfied by "the mere fact that an
activity involves billions of dollars," for the statute must first be
shown to regulate an activity that "affects 'commerce' in the first
place." 2 6 Therefore, it is necessary to examine what the lower
courts understand to be the activities included in "commerce."
2. The Definition of "Commerce": What Is Economic Activity?
Much of Commerce Clause litigation has been an attempt to
define the boundaries of the concept of "commerce." 237 Because
almost everything people do has an economic component, commerce, if defined simply as economic activity, could be practically
limitless, and the power to regulate commerce could include the
authority to regulate every decision people make. Although the
limitation of Congress's authority to only those actions concerning
interstate commerce may have been meaningful when the Constitution was written because localities were much more self-sufficient,
that limitation has little force today in our increasingly national
economy, where the ability to transport goods and information
quickly between states is expanding continuously.238 Therefore,
1360, 1364 (D. Ariz. 1995) (stating that upholding thejurisdictional element in § 228
"would in essence give Congress carte blanche to regulate any area it deemed
appropriate, even if such area was traditionally one regulated by the States").
'I
See infra part III.A.2 (discussing some of the difficult issues involved in
attempting to define "commerce" under the Commerce Clause).
9 22
"s See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995) (holding that §
(q)
"contains nojurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry,
that [the action in question] affects interstate commerce").
United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830, 837 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
See TRIBE, supra note 62, § 5-4, at 306-10 (discussing the changes in Supreme
Court ideas about whether commerce should be evaluated formalistically or
functionally).
' See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980)
("'Today many commercial transactions touch two or more States and may involve
parties separated by the full continent.'" (quoting McGee v. International Life Ins.
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if a principled distinction is to be drawn between activities that
Congress may and may not regulate, some limitations must be
placed on what constitutes commerce.
Defining commerce as commercial activity does not advance this
analysis without a definition of "commercial."" 9 Classic commercial transactions are arm's-length transactions between businesses.
Transactions in which only one party is in business, however, are
also commercial.
For example, when a consumer purchases a
washing machine from an appliance dealer, the fact that the
consumer is not acting for business purposes, but rather for
personal reasons, does not make the transaction any less commercial. Similarly, a transaction in which neither party is "in the
business" of selling washing machines is still commercial, even
though a private market has replaced a public market. When the
consumer decides to buy her neighbor's washing machine instead
of going to a dealer, she has replaced a public market with a private
market.
Having established that commercial activity extends beyond
business transactions, it is necessary to designate the common
element in these personal transactions that makes them commercial. I will define "commerce" as all transactions involving
the exchange of value for an obligation, whether that obligation
arises by status or by contract. Such a definition would clearly
encompass the traditional business transaction without excluding
the sale transaction between neighbors. Child support would also
qualify as commerce under this definition because it is an exchange
of value in the form of money that arises from the obligation of
parentage.
The courts have mainly defined commerce by analogy to specific
practices. In finding § 922(q) unconstitutional, the Lopez Court held
that the activity it regulated was not commerce:
Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to
do with "commerce" or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms. Section 922(q) is not an
essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which

Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957))); Calhoun, supra note 31, at 924 (noting that
"[c]hild support enforcement, which has traditionally been a state matter, has become
national in scope because of the increasing mobility of American citizens").
2" The following two paragraphs are my attempts to define "commerce" for use
in the subsequent discussion.
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the regulatory scheme 24could
be undercut unless the intrastate
0
activity were regulated.
The activity that Congress regulated in § 9 22(q) was the possession
of a firearm in or near a school. 241 In contrast to § 9 22(q), the
activity regulated in § 228-the failure to pay a debt owed to a child
in another state-clearly has an economic component. In Lopez, the
Court rejected the government's arguments that the possession of
a firearm near a school is economic because it increases the
potential for violent crime, which has a negative effect on the
economy, and because it negatively impacts the educational
environment and, thus, inhibits the development of children into
educated and economically productive citizens. 242
The Court
explained that the government's cost-of-crime and national-productivity analyses would effectively abolish any limits on the definition
of "commerce" and that the link between Lopez's activity and
interstate commerce was too tenuous to justify Congress's regula-

tion.

24

3

In applying the Lopez analysis of what constitutes commerce to
§ 228, the Schroeder court focused on the criminal nature of the
penalties imposed by the statute and concluded that because some
states have enacted their own criminal statutes in this area, there is
no connection to interstate commerce. 244 The Arizona court
apparently chose words out of context to justify its otherwise
unreasoned conclusion. Whether the states have chosen to impose
their own criminal sanctions for the nonpayment of support has no
bearing on whether Congress's regulation of nonpayment of support
constitutes commerce.
The Schroeder court reached the heart of its commerce analysis
245
in the context of discussing the CSRA's legislative history.
Relying on a broad definition of commerce as "the commercial
intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630-31 (1995).
See 18 U.S.C. § 92 2 (q) (1994).
242 See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632-33.
2143See id. at 1632 (stating that if the Court "were to accept the Government's
arguments, [it would be] hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that
Congress is without power to regulate").
244 See United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360, 1364 (D. Ariz. 1995)
("Therefore, the fact that this statute is a criminal statute aimed at an area of activity
which has already been addressed by the States supports this court's finding that the
CSRA is not substantially related to interstate commerce . . . ."); United States v.
Schroeder,
894 F. Supp. 360, 364 (D. Ariz. 1995) (same).
245
See Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1366; Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 367.
240

241
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branches," 246 the court concluded that "[t]here is no commercial
intercourse involved in the collection of delinquent child support
payments. If the collection of debt were sufficient to warrant
federal criminal intervention, Congress would be able to legislate in
virtually any area." 24 The problem with this statement is that the
court does not explain the reasoning of its conclusion; rather, the
court uses a slippery slope argument to assert a policy goal of
decreased governmental regulation.
The Parker court explains its similar conclusion in more detail.
The government's brief in Parkeradvanced two arguments addressing why commerce is affected when child support obligations are
unpaid.2 48 Under a "basic necessities" theory, the government
argued that families that are denied child support may be unable to
afford necessary goods and services, thus impacting commerce
between the states. 249 The government also contended that the
failure to obtain court-ordered support forces many families to turn
to federal welfare funding, and large welfare expenditures impact
interstate commerce. 5
Finding that, if the government's arguments were accepted, Congress would have the authority to prohibit
"any crime that deprives another person of money," the court
dismissed the arguments as being too attenuated to withstand
scrutiny under Lopez. 251 The Parker court's dismissal of these
theories, however, may be attributable to a lack of concrete
knowledge about the size of the interstate child support problem.
Also, Parker'sdismissal of the basic necessities theory hinges on the
court's argument that such a rationale would allow Congress to
regulate all theft and fraud that deprives individuals of
resources. 25 2 Because § 228 reaches only one specific form of
interstate "theft," and Congress has previously regulated other
2 53
and wire fraud, 254
forms of interstate theft, such as mail fraud
the Parker argument is unpersuasive.
2"4Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 189-90 (1824).
247Mussari, 894

F. Supp. at 1366; Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 367.

" See United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830, 832 (E.D. Pa. 1995).

249

See id. at 837.
m See id.
25 Id. at 838.
252 See

id. ("Congress, under this scenario, could punish embezzlers, con artists,
and muggers-even if their activity was solely intrastate-because the proceeds of the
crimes likely would have helped the victim afford food, housing, medical care, or

other goods and services.").
3 See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
- See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994).
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Confronted with similar government arguments, other federal
district courts have found that § 228 is constitutional. Under Lopez,
an activity may be regulated if it has a "substantial relation to
interstate commerce" or "substantially affect[s] interstate commerce," even if the substantial effect is only the result of combining
255
all of the individual instances of regulation under a statute.
The Sage court concluded that because the nonsupporting parent
acquires an economic benefit from not making support payments
and has more money to spend in commerce, and the child has a
corresponding loss of economic benefits, there is a direct impact on
the consumption of goods in interstate commerce and, thus, on the
distribution of income among states. 256
Even though each
instance of nonsupport may not have a large effect on interstate
commerce, the total unpaid support in interstate cases, about $14
billion, would have an enormous impact on the interstate market in
goods. 257 In Sage, the court did not conclude that the act of
nonpayment was itself an act in interstate commerce, but that these
acts did have a substantial effect on interstate commerce such that
they may be regulated under the logic of Wickard v. Filburn258 and

259
Maryland v. Wirtz.

The Hopper court took a slightly different approach by comparing Congress's authority to regulate the collection of child support
with Congress's authority to collect other kinds of intangible obligations.260 By analogy to cases interpreting the word "commerce"
in relation to the Sherman Act, 261 the Hopper court held that the
collection of child support is itself interstate commerce because it
"involve[s] a continuous and indivisible stream of intercourse among
the states involving the transmission of large sums of money and

- United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629-31 (1995) (tracing the Court's
decisions regarding what constitutes a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
' See United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84, 89-90 (D. Conn. 1995).
2" See id. at 90 (observing that "Congress also considered noteworthy the fact that
between 30 and 40 percent of all delinquent child support cases involve interstate
obligations").
m 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) (holding that the federal government may regulate
an individual's action when "his contribution, taken together with that of many others
similarly situated, [has a] far from trivial" impact on interstate commerce).
29 392 U.S. 183, 196-97 n.27 (1968) (holding that the "de minimis character of
individual instances arising under [a] statute is of no consequence" when the statute
is substantially
related to commerce).
2
6 See United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389, 392-93 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
261 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994) (providing criminal penalties for illegal restraints of
trade).
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communications by mail, telephone and telegraph."26 2
Citing
cases that hold that interstate fire insurance transactions, real estate
brokerage, the distribution of news, and medical services to a health
cooperative constitute interstate commerce, the Hopper court
concluded that the collection of intangible debt for child support
also constitutes commerce because it is similar to the collection of
263
other kinds of debt regulated by Congress.
The Murphy court employed a third line of reasoning to hold
that § 228 was within Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause. Because what § 228 really does is regulate the channels of
interstate travel, its constitutionality should be considered in light
of the line of cases that hold that Congress, within the scope of its
Commerce Clause power, can criminalize activity relating to
interstate travel. 264 For example, Congress can make it a federal
crime for a person to flee a state to avoid prosecution or for a
witness to flee in order to avoid a subpoena to testify. 26 5 Section
228 can be seen as an extension of such statutes to the specific area
of child support enforcement; nonsupporting parents are often
already criminals under state law and flee the state because they
know that there is a slim chance of being caught if they are beyond
the state's territorial jurisdiction.2 6 This analysis fails, however,
if it is the custodial parent who has moved interstate.
On the basis of these more thorough analyses of the classification of the collection of child support debt, it seems clear that this
activity meets the Lopez requirement of having a substantial effect
on interstate commerce, even if the act of withholding payment is
not commerce in each individual instance. Although this activity
262
Hopper,899 F. Supp. at 393 (invoking the doctrine of United States v. Shubert,
348 U.S. 222, 226 (1955)).

263 See id. at 392-93.

264 See United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614, 616-17 (W.D. Va. 1995) (stating
that "Lopez does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws aimed at regulating the use
of interstate travel").
21 See id. at 616 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1994)); see also United States v. Toledo,
985 F.2d 1462, 1465-67 (10th Cir.) (criminalizing the common law crime of
kidnapping when it involves interstate travel under 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994)), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 218 (1993); Simmons v. Zerbst, 18 F. Supp. 929, 929-30 (N.D. Ga.
1937) (affirming Congress's Commerce Clause power to punish fugitives who travel
from one state to another under the Fugitive Felony Act, 18 U.S.C. § 408(e), now
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1994)); United States v. Miller, 17 F. Supp. 65, 67 (W.D.
Ky. 1936) (same).
21 See Weitzman, supra note 30, at 263 (reporting survey results that show that
"[t]he easiest way for a man to evade a child support order is to move to another
state").
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does not come within the traditional paradigm of commerce-the
business transaction267--its effects have an impact in the billions
of dollars on the ability of custodial parents and children to engage
in commerce. It is also important to realize that the criminal provisions of the CSRA are ajustified regulation of interstate commerce
because they are one piece in a larger package of legislation regulat268
ing the economic activity of federal spending on welfare.
Although the criminal provisions of the CSRA are not indispensable
to the larger system of regulation, they promise to be a very
effective tool for reaching the intrastate act of not paying child
support that tremendously impacts welfare spending and interstate
economies.
3. Legislative History
In attempting to solve the question of whether § 9 22(q) was
constitutional, the Lopez Court also examined the statute's legislative
history and concluded that there were no explicit findings that
would explain Congress's presumption that there is a connection
between the possession of guns near schools and interstate
commerce. 269 Although the Court noted that such explicit findings are not required in order for Congress to exercise its authority,
it explained that, in cases of questionable legislative judgment,
270
formal findings would help clarify Congress's reasoning.
In contrast to the paucity of legislative history concerning
interstate commerce for § 9 22(q), there was a substantial amount of
testimony before Congress regarding § 228 of the CSRA. There
were also explicit findings in the House Judiciary Committee's
report that linked the failure to pay interstate child support debts
to interstate commerce.27 1 The Sage court noted that Congress
26 7

See United States v. Mennuti, 639 F.2d 107, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding the
federal arson statute to be inapplicable to private residences because they are not

"business" property and thus are not related to interstate commerce). But see Russell
v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 861-62 (1985) (holding that the federal arson statute
applied to a private home that had at one time been in the rental market because
renting is an activity that affects commerce and can be regulated under the commerce
clause). Following the logic of Russell, it can be argued that nonpayment of a child
support debt can also be made a federal crime because the nonpaying parent would

pay the debt with money earned through employment, which may be regulated under
the Commerce Clause.
2"9 Cf United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995).
1 See id. at 1631-32.
270See id. at 1631.
27 See H.R. REP. No. 771, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-7 (1992).
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considered the inability of states to enforce their own support
orders in interstate cases and found that the accumulating debt was
having a substantial impact on federal and state welfare expendi2 2
tures and the ability of custodial parents and children to subsist. 1
The Hampshire court also discussed the Committee's report, which
indicated that in 1989 alone, $5.1 billion in child support went
uncollected. 2" Because § 228 would be a useful tool in collecting
some of that debt, it could be expected to have a substantial effect
on the national economy.
The Schroederand Mussaricourts examined the same Committee
report and concluded that it offered no evidence supporting a
connection between interstate commerce and the nonpayment of
child support obligations. 274 They conceded that the legislative
history demonstrated that Congress understood the need for an
interstate nexus before it could act, but they concluded that there
was no evidence to show that Congress made the determination that
the collection of debt was commerce. 2 5 The courts are correct
that Congress never used the word "commerce" in describing the
reasons for, or the desired effects of, the legislation. Congress's
actions are not invalid, however, simply because it failed to invoke
a magic word; 216 the report details the current difficulties in
collecting interstate support in terms of its economic consequences
and describes the criminal and restitutionary penalties of § 228 in
the larger scheme of federal involvement in interstate collection
under Congress's taxing and spending powers.2 77 Given the pains
that the Committee took in acquiring the statistics on the percentage of debt that comes from interstate cases, its approximate
amount, and its dramatic effect on the economic lives of custodial
See United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84, 90-91 (D. Conn. 1995).
2" See United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327, 1329-30 (D. Kan. 1995)
2

(citing H.R. REP. No. 771, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1992)).
274 See United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360, 1366 (D. Ariz. 1995) (finding
"no specific legislative history which would support that the CSRA is aimed at
interstate commerce"); United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360, 367 (D. Ariz.
1995) (same).
21 See Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1366 (finding that "[t]here is no commercial
intercourse involved in the collection of delinquent child support payments");
Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 367 (same).
21 See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995) (holding that Congress
need not make specific findings about the impact of proposed legislation on interstate
commerce and that their failure to do so is not determinative of the statute's
constitutionality).
27 See H.R. REP. No. 771, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-7 (1992).
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parents and children,27 it is likely the Committee members were
astonished to learn that their efforts had been interpreted as having
failed to discuss the substantial impact of the proposed legislation
on interstate commerce.
In addition to the Committee report and the floor debate on the
CSRA, Congress received many other reports detailing the enormous financial impact and the consequences of the nonpayment of
support. Congress received a report from the Office of Child
Support Enforcement in 1989, which indicated that of the $8.2
billion owed in child support for the fiscal year 1989, fifty of the
fifty-four U.S. jurisdictions that reported data collected only $3.9
" Also in 1989, the total amount of support due from prior
billion.279
years was $15.7 billion, but only $1.1 billion, or seven percent, was
collected nationally. 28 0 The same report also described the necessity of federal involvement to improve the performance of state-run
Title IV-D agencies. 21 ' The U.S. Commission on Interstate Child
Support's 1992 report to Congress revealed that only one dollar of
every ten dollars ordered in support is actually collected in
interstate cases and encouraged the development of a national
computer network that would improve the availability of informa28 2
tion about the location and income of child support obligors.
If these unpaid amounts were collected, even partially, the resulting
impact on the transfer of economic resources among states would
be tremendous, drastically increasing the ability of custodial parents
and children to participate in interstate commerce and dramatically
reducing the amount of money spent on federal entitlement

programs, which would free that money for other federal uses. As
evidenced by the recent standoff over the federal budget, the
allocation of federal money can exert a great deal of influence over
investment and commercial markets.

283

2' See id.
279 See OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR THE PERIOD ENDING

SEPT.
2 30, 1989, at 5-6 (1989).
80 See id.
281 See id.
282 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
2
See Gary Hoffman, Bill Roney: Get Used to Market Volatility Tied to Politics,
DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 13, 1996, at B1; Lawrence Malkin, Wall Street's Wild Days! Up,
Down, All Around, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 13, 1996, at 1.

1514 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 1469

4. Federalism and Comity
The federal district courts' arguments about whether § 228
offends the traditional notions of federalism and comity are based
on a footnote in Lopez that reaffirms that the "'[s]tates possess
284
primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law."'
The note continues with a limitation on this absolute statement,
however, by recognizing Congress's authority to create criminal
offenses when it is acting within the scope of its delegated powers
under the Constitution.2 85 Therefore, if the Court had concluded
that § 9 22(q) was within Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause, the criminal nature of the regulation would not have been
objectionable because the Constitution does not limit Congress to
2 86
civil regulation.
The Bailey court did not specifically hold that the regulations in
§ 228 exceed Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause, but
rather held that Congress violated the principles of federalism by
involving the federal courts in an area that traditionally has been,
and should continue to be, reserved to the states. 28 7 The main
objection in Bailey is that Congress has improperly involved itself in
the state law of domestic relations, not that Congress has improperly created a new federal crime.28 8 For reasons articulated
below,289 neither the Constitution nor the common law doctrines of
abstention prevent Congress or the federal courts from acting to
assist the collection of delinquent child support payments, and,
thus, the Bailey court had no authority to act as a superlegislature
and declare § 228 to be invalid simply because it does not think it
was a wise policy choice. 29" The Bailey court's invocation of the
284 United

States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 n.3 (1995) (quoting Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (1993) (citations omitted)).
285 See id. (citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109 (1945) (plurality
opinion)).
281 See TRIBE, supra note 62, § 5-3, at 301 (explaining that Congress may employ
any manner of regulation when acting under its enumerated powers as long as there
are no limitations on that form of regulation in other parts of the Constitution); see
also Screws, 325 U.S. at 109 ("Under our federal system the administration of criminal
justice rests with the States except as Congress, acting within the scope of [its]
delegated powers, has created offenses against the United States.").
218See United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727, 729 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
21 See id. at 727 (describing the historical reluctance of federal courts to
"becom[e] embroiled in state family matters").
219 See infra part III.A.4.b.

o See Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314,333 (1981) (stating that the lower court had
exceeded its role by "passing on the wisdom of congressional policy determinations");
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principles of federalism is evidence of concern about the federal

government's growing involvement in areas previously managed
solely by states and the consequential lack of attention paid to

constitutional provisions, such as the Tenth Amendment, which may
preserve an appropriate federal-state balance.
a. The Tenth Amendment

Long considered by the courts to be a "truism" with little
substantive meaning, 291 the Tenth Amendment was added to the
Constitution to reaffirm that whereas the powers of Congress are
29 2
limited, those of the states are "'numerous and indefinite.'"
The Tenth Amendment provides that "[t]he powers not delegated

to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
293
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

Although the words of the amendment would seem to imply that
Congress has a very limited arena in which to act, they have not
been read restrictively. While explaining the scope of the federal

government's powers under the Constitution, as opposed to under
the Articles of Confederation, the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution does not "exclude[] incidental or implied powers," nor

"require[] that everything granted ... be expressly and minutely

described." 294 It found support for this statement in the fact that
the Tenth Amendment omits the word "expressly" before the word
25
"delegated."
Recently, the Court has attempted to infuse the Tenth Amend-

ment with more substantive authority. The dissent in Garciav. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority29

objected that the Court's

New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) ("In short, the judiciary may not sit
as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy
determinations ...

."); United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc., 31 F.3d 138,

153 (3d Cir. 1994) (Nygaard,J., concurring) (stating that it is not the court's role "to
act as a superlegislature and second-guess the policy choices that Congress made").
" See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941) (upholding the
minimum wage and maximum hour requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act
over an argument that the Act violated the Tenth Amendment).
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No.
45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
29 U.S. CONST. amend. X.

I McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819).
295 See id. at 406-07 (detailing the differences between the "embarrassing" scope

of federal power under the Articles of Confederation and that under the Constitution).
2 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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decision in that case "effectively reduce[d] the Tenth Amendment
to meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the
Commerce Clause."29 7 The dissent advocated a balancing test to
determine when Congress has overstepped its Tenth Amendment
299
Both Garcia and New York v. United States,
bounds. 298
addressed the Tenth Amendment in light of federal statutes that
applied federal law to the states directly or required states to
legislate directly in a particular area, as opposed to statutes that
regulated private behavior. 0 0
In New York, the Court struck down a method of congressional
regulation that required the states to legislate directly, for the Court
recognized that this method of regulating the states improperly
interfered with the states' sovereign powers, even if Congress would
8 01
have had the power to enact the desired regulation themselves.
Neither Garcia nor New York imply that the Tenth Amendment
could be the basis for declaring an otherwise constitutional exercise
of Commerce Clause authority to be unconstitutional, nor do they
provide support for the proposition that Congress does not have the
power to regulate private activity. Section 228 regulates the
behavior of private parties without interfering with state sovereignty
30 2
by "commandeering" the state political or legislative processes.
As such, § 228 should not be held unconstitutional unless it is found
to exceed the boundaries of acceptable regulation under the
Commerce Clause.
The Tenth Amendment protects the federal-state balance
established by the Constitution. The Schroeder and Mussari courts

29 Id. at 560 (Powell, J., dissenting).

'" See id. at 562-63 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that balancing would assess,
among other factors, the indignity and injury to the states if they had to comply with
federal statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause).
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
"0 See id. at 159-61, 166-69; Garcia,469 U.S. at 530-31. But see New York, 505 U.S.
at 201-02 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that the
distinction between statutes that regulate only states and those that also regulate
private parties is unsupported by the Court's Tenth Amendmentjurisprudence and
arguing that "[a]n incursion on state sovereignty hardly seems more constitutionally
acceptable if the federal statute that 'commands' specific action also applies to private
parties").
s. See New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
' Cf id. at 161 ("Congress may not simply 'commandee[r] the. legislative
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal
regulatory program.'" (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981))).
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claimed that the following quote from United States v. Bass303 supports their contention that § 228 of the CSRA has upset this
balance:
[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be
deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance.
Congress has traditionally been reluctant to define as a federal
crime conduct readily denounced as criminal by the States. This
congressional policy is rooted in the same concepts of American
federalism that have provided the basis for judge-made doctrines
.... As this Court emphasized only last Term... we will not be
quick to assume that Congress has meant to effect a significant
change in the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal
jurisdiction. In traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation
affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement
assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring
into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision 0 4
Neither opinion, however, examines, as the excerpt demands,
whether Congress specifically meant to alter the federal-state
balance in the area of child support enforcement. After quoting the
above language, the court in both Schroeder and Mussari moved on
to the next stage of its analysis without undertaking an examination
of whether Congress did face the issues involved in altering the
federal balance.
Congress did, in fact, deal with the issue of superseding state
criminal laws and found that such action was justified in this
circumstance. TheJudiciary Committee's report describes the state
criminal laws that punish avoidance of child support obligations and
notes that most states have adopted URESA, which provides for the
extradition of child support defendants."' 5 But the report concludes that federal intervention is necessary because leaving
interstate child support enforcement in the hands of the states has
proven to be a "tedious, cumbersome and slow method of collection" and has "utterly failed to bring to justice" the most egregious
cases of nonsupport."' 6 Additionally, as explained in Hopper, even
though criminal law is generally the province of the states, there

-3 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
s Id. at 349 (citations and footnotes omitted); see also United States v. Mussari,
894 F. Supp. 1360, 1367 (D. Ariz. 1995) (quoting this language to support its
contention that § 228 of the CSRA is unconstitutional); United States v. Schroeder,
894 F. Supp. 360, 367-68 (D. Ariz. 1995) (same).
305 H.R. REP. No. 771, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1992).
so6Id. at 6.
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exists no support for the theory put forth in Schroeder and Mussari
that "principles" of federalism may be used to declare an otherwise
valid act of Congress to be unconstitutional simply because the
statute imposes a criminal penalty."' 7 The federal statute at issue
in Lopez was not declared unconstitutional simply because states also
had criminal statutes concerning firearm possession.30 8 Therefore,
Lopez does not offer support for the contention in both Schroeder
and Mussari that Congress may not exact a criminal rather than a
civil penalty when it acts within its enumerated areas of authority.
b. Federal Court Abstention in Family Law Cases
Another one of the major underlying assumptions in the
Schroeder, Mussari, and Bailey opinions is that federal involvement in
family law issues, such as child support, is, at best, inappropriate. 0 9 Their assumptions3 10 are based on language in Lopez that
suggests that Congress may not regulate in the area of family law by
relying on its Commerce Clause authority when the only tenuous
connection between the family and interstate commerce is a theory
that family structures affect national productivity and that national
productivity in turn affects interstate commerce. 311 Contrary to
the reading of the lower courts, this passage in Lopez does not stand
for the proposition that all regulation of matters affecting families
is prohibited under the Commerce Clause; Lopez simply requires
that the regulation of family law issues have a more immediate
connection to interstate commerce than an imprecise economic
variable such as national productivity.
Federal courts have historically been unwilling to involve
themselves in the regulation of marriage and family structure under

...
See United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389, 393 (S.D. Ind. 1995). "
" See United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84, 92 (D. Conn. 1995) ("Lopez did not
turn on whether a regulated activity traditionally has been the province of the
states.").

s See United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727, 728 (W.D. Tex. 1995); United
States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360, 1367 (D. Ariz. 1995); United States v. Schroeder,
894 F. Supp. 360, 368 (D. Ariz. 1995).
310 See Bailey, 902 F. Supp. at 728; Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1364 (citing Lopez's
objection to government regulation of family law, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1632 (1995));
Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 365 (same).
s.See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1661 (1995) (Breyer,J., dissenting)
("To hold this statute constitutional is not to ... hold that the Commerce Clause
permits the Federal Government ... to regulate 'marriage, divorce, and child
custody' .... " (quoting language used in the majority opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, 115 S. Ct. at 1632)).
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the theory that these issues should be under the sole control of the12
states because the issues are inherently of local concern.
Federal courts frequently would abstain from hearing cases in
diversity that would otherwise be heard under their jurisdictional
authority when the cases involved matters concerning domestic
relations."- 3

The Supreme Court in Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 14

however, explained that there were significant limits to the doctrine
of federal abstention in family law cases. The Court first concluded
that the Constitution does not prevent the federal courts from
dealing with domestic relations issues in the exercise of diversity
jurisdiction.3 15 The Court went on to find that the original
decision to exclude certain domestic relations matters from the
federal courts'jurisdiction was based upon a questionable historical
construction of the diversity jurisdiction statute.3 16 Nonetheless,
the Court held that it would not disturb that construction because
Congress, through its inaction, has apparently accepted this
317
interpretation for over a century.
Despite its decision to uphold the validity of the general
domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction, the
Court found that this exception to the exercise of federal jurisdiction was limited to the original "issuance of a divorce, alimony, or
child custody decree" and that federal courts had thus always been
capable of enforcing the final decrees of state courts. 1 ' If the
federal courts can enforce alimony decrees with the same authority
with which they can enforce other contracts, then, by analogy, there
should be no bar to the federal courts' enforcement of existing child
support decrees. When enforcing existing child support decrees,
however, the lower courts seem particularly concerned about a
12

See e.g., Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1858) (establishing the
principle that federal courts have nojurisdiction over original suits for divorce or the
award of alimony). The Barber Court went on to hold that the United States district
courts hadjurisdiction to hear a diversity suit seeking to enforce the wife's claim for
court-awarded alimony against her ex-husband, who lived in a different state, and
over whom the first state did not have jurisdiction. See id. at 599-600.
313 See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (citing several federal
cases as examples of this pattern).
314 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
s15 See id. at 695.
316 See id. at 698-700.
317See id. at 700-01.
3"8 Id. at 704; see also Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 599 (1858) (stating
that the plaintiff in that case, suing for the recovery of alimony already decreed, could
have brought suit in a district court of the United States).
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defendant's ability under § 228 to challenge his conviction by
bringing a collateral attack on the underlying support order, thus
embroiling the federal courts in a substantive adjudication of
custody and support issues under state law."1 9 It is clear that
under Barber v. Barber and its progeny, such a federal role would be
impermissible.3 21 It is far from clear, however, that such federal
involvement in substantive custody and support issues would be a
necessary, or even a possible, outcome of enforcement proceedings
under § 228.321
On a practical level, the United States Attorneys do not have the
resources to prosecute every parent who refuses to pay an interstate
child support obligation, or even to prosecute every case that is
brought to their attention.3 22
As a result, the cases that the
government decides to prosecute will probably be those involving
the most flagrant violations of state law, such as Jeffrey
Nichols's,3 23 or cases referred by state enforcement agencies when
those agencies have reached substantial roadblocks. Therefore,
although the number of federal cases that will be prosecuted under
§ 228 will certainly increase, the federal courts will still only be
involved in a very small percentage of child support cases.
More fundamentally, a defendant in a § 228 prosecution will not
be able to challenge the validity of the underlying enforcement

"9See United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727, 729 (W.D. Tex. 1995)
("[E]nforcement of 18 U.S.C. § 228 invariably would open the door to abatement
motions and counterclaims for change of custody or defenses based on changed
circumstances ...

."); United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360, 1367 (D. Ariz.

1995) (emphasizing the concerns expressed in Bailey); United States v. Schroeder, 894
F. Supp. 360, 368 (D. Ariz. 1995) (same).
" See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 595-97 (1890) (holding that federal courts do
not have jurisdiction to issue original orders in child support cases); Barber,62 U.S.
(21 How.) at 584 (stating that federal courts lack jurisdiction "upon the subject of
divorce, or for the allowance of alimony... as an original proceeding in chancery").
321 Defendants Hopper and Hampshire contended that other federal abstention
doctrines, such as those explained in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315,332 (1943)
(holding that a federal court may refusejurisdiction to avoid interfering with complex
state regulatory policy), and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971) (holding that
a federal court may abstain fromjurisdiction to avoid interferingwith a pendingstate
criminal prosecution), would prevent the federal courts from exercisingjurisdiction
over § 228 cases. See United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389,393 (S.D. Ind. 1995);
United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327, 1331 (D. Kan. 1995). Neither
defendant made a strong case for abstention.
" See Deadbeat Dad Enforcement, supra note 186, at 2 (discussing the criticism
received by the Justice Department for its lax enforcement of the CSRA and the
resulting 1995 campaign of increased prosecution under that law).
...
See supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text.
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order because the past-due amount is not modifiable once a state
court has entered a final judgment on it.3 24 Therefore, the only
potential challenge to the underlying order would be a prospective
challenge, which would have to be made in the state that has
continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the support order.3 25 A
federal court would almost certainly decline to exercise pendent
jurisdiction 26 over that claim and would dismiss the claim in
anticipation of an appropriate state suit. The resulting state
proceeding would not affect the outcome of the federal proceeding
because it would be concerned with a different period of time.
The Bailey court contends that a federal court, in implementing
the restitutionary provisions of § 228, would inevitably become
"embroiled in state family law matters." 27 As a result of having
to determine a defendant's ability to comply with a state support
order because "[the court] would not convict a non-paying parent
who, subsequent to divorce, had become quadriplegic," the court
abatement motions and
would necessarily "open the door to
3 28
counterclaims for changes of custody."
There are two responses to this concern. First, it has not been
demonstrated, either by the Bailey court or elsewhere, that federal
courts are incapable of determining the ability of a defendant to pay
restitution and determining reasonable payment schedules; this task
does not invoke state domestic relations law and is not beyond the
expertise of federal judges, who often impose fines as parts of
criminal sentences.3 29 Second, the Bailey court seems to be afraid
that the "ability to pay" issue will expand and generate counterclaims based on substantive domestic relations law.330 In reality,
the ability to pay analysis is much narrower. It asks only whether
the defendant has willfully failed to pay support obligations.3 3 ' As
324

See MELLI ET AL., supra note 152, at

18-62.

Seesuprapart II.A.3.c (discussing the limited ability of states to modify existing
orders under UIFSA).
.26 A modification proceeding would involve the federal courts in the establishment of an original child support order, an action that would be contrary to the
doctrine of Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 694-95 (1992) (recognizing a
domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction).
'228 United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727, 729 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
32

Id. at 729.
s2 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 5E1.2 (1996) (requiringjudges to impose
3

fines on all defendants able to pay them).
See Bailey, 902 F. Supp. at 729.
331 See 18 U.S.C. § 228(a) (1994) (limiting the section's coverage to individuals who
"willfully fail[]" to pay child support).
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the legislative history of the CSRA reveals, willfulness is a standard
borrowed from the Federal Tax Code's crime of willful failure to
collect or pay tax obligations, and a successful tax prosecution
requires the government to "'establish, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that at the time payment was due the taxpayer possessed sufficient
funds to enable him to meet his obligation or that the lack of
sufficient funds on such date was created by (or was the result of)
a voluntary and intentional act without justification.' 3 3 2 Thus, a
quadriplegic defendant who could not support himself would not be
found to have "willfully" failed to pay child support, unless he was
quite wealthy. Also, this analysis leaves no room for counterclaims.
For the reasons discussed above, it is clear that the criminal
provisions of the CSRA, as a constitutional matter, do not upset the
federal-state balance established by the Tenth Amendment and
federal abstention doctrine. Many critics have argued, however, that
Congress should not enact federal criminal legislation, such as § 228
of the CSRA, as a matter of policy.
B. The Federalizationof Crime and Its Critics
As Congress continues to expand the scope of federal criminal
law by creating new federal crimes, many scholars and judges have
argued that the federalization of crime violates principles of
federalism and results in the misuse of federal judicial resources.
Federal criminal filings increased by approximately seventy percent
during the 1980s,3 33 and some judges worry that the resulting
increased caseload will create clogged dockets, which will inevitably
reduce the quality of the federal judiciary's work.334 For a number
of reasons, the primary concern of commentators seems to be the
creation of federal criminal laws that mirror laws already in
place in the states. 335
There is a general belief that these

-52 H.R. REP. No. 771, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1992) (quoting United States v.
Poll, 521 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1975)).
...
See Stephen Chippendale, Note, More Harm Than Good: Assessing Federalization
of CriminalLaw, 79 MINN. L. REV. 455, 456 (1994) (advocating that Congress appoint
a commission to discourage the creation of new federal criminal statutes).
" See William P. Marshall, Federalization:A CriticalOverview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV.
719, 719 (1995) (citing a 1993 letter from Ninth Circuit Chief Judge J. Clifford
Wallace, who emphasized this concern to ChiefJustice William Rehnquist, Attorney
General Janet Reno, and others). But see Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of
Federalization,46 HASTINGS L.J. 1029, 1038-47 (1995) (addressing the "myth" that
federal courts' time is so monopolized by criminal cases that important civil cases are
pushed aside).
" See Marshall, supra note 334, at 720 (warning that "federalization may directly
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duplicative laws not only create a waste ofjudicial and prosecutorial
resources but also usurp each state's authority to declare the
appropriate punishment for a crime.336 Because the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines set rather severe mandatory minimum
sentences for certain categories of crimes, the federal penalties are
33 7
often harsher than the state penalties for the same action.
Furthermore, the uncertainty of which punishment, state or federal,
should apply raises due process concerns when similarly situated
offenders are punished differently and lessens the deterrent effect
of the more stringent federal penalty."' 8 Also, because federal
prosecutions occur in such a small percentage of eligible cases,
some commentators have expressed concern that there may be bias
in the way federal cases are selected and, also, that such a small
intrusion into an area otherwise controlled by states is not worth the
cost to the principles of federalism."' 8
In analyzing solutions to these problems, most commentators
admit that the drive to federalize crimes must be stopped by
Congress or by the prosecutorial policies of the Department of
Justice because, given the expansive nature of most Commerce
Clause interpretations, the federal courts will probably be unable,
or at least extremely unwilling, to find a majority of these statutes

impinge upon individual rights as the creation of federal crimes paralleling state
offenses perils the protections for the individual found in the Double Jeopardy
Clause"); H. Scott Wallace, When More Is Less: The Drive to Federalize Is a Road to
Ruin, CRIM.JtST., Fall 1993, at 8,52 (lamenting that "Congress is now in the business
of creating massive disparities between federal and state penalties for the same
conduct"); Chippendale, supra note 333, at 461-62 (noting that "[o]ver the last two
decades Congress has transformed federal law enforcement by enacting a determinate
sentencing scheme, mandatory sentencing statutes, and criminal statutes that
essentially duplicate state codes" (footnotes omitted)).
" See Sara S. Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principlesto Define the Proper
Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 981-82 (1995)
(contending that "there are sound reasons for the states rather than the federal
government to play the leading role in general criminal enforcement").
557
See Wallace, supranote 335, at 50 (discussing federal death penalties that apply
in some drug cases, even when the criminal activity does not directly involve interstate
travel, and the state in which the activity occurred does not have the death penalty).
"' See Beale, supra note 336, at 997-1001 (arguing that "structural inequalities"
occur when state and federal courts produce different results in similar cases and
that, as a practical matter, federal prosecutors do not have sufficient resources to
supplant state criminaljurisdiction completely in the areas where the federal and state
governments have concurrent jurisdiction).
...
See Wallace, supranote 335, at 52-53 (arguing that the extreme arbitrariness of
federal prosecutions is unfair to individual defendants and weakens the potential
deterrent effect of criminal laws and, therefore, that the federalization of crime does
not produce benefits that justify distorting the federal-state balance).
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unconstitutional.3 40 The result in Lopez is held out as hope that
federal courts will begin to restrict the extent of permissible
regulation under the Commerce Clause, the power behind most new
federal criminal law.3 41 The major problem in respecting the
borders of federalism, these authors conclude, lies in the development of a principled way to distinguish those areas in which a
federal criminal statute is appropriate from those in which it is
not.142 Although the imposition of federal criminal sanctions for
violations of child support orders is new, it is important to note that
federal courts, when acting under diversity jurisdiction, have always
been able to enforce the final and unmodifiable judgments of state
courts for amounts of overdue child support. 4 '
Thus, while
Congress has given the federal courts a new type of sanction for the
failure to pay child support in the form of § 228, it has not granted
the federal courts a completely new area of jurisdiction.
Several attempts have been made to define the principles of
federalism. One suggestion, made over twenty years ago by the
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, is to
limit federal jurisdiction to cases that involve a substantial federal
interest. 344 As pointed out by other commentators, however, the
problem with a standard that conditions federal action on a crime's
SO See Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime: Some Thoughts on
Saving the FederalJudicialyfrom the Federalizationof State Crime, 43 U. KAN. L. REV.
503, 529-30 (1995) (arguing that legislators have unnecessarily involved federal
resources in crimes of local importance in an effort to show that they are taking a
tough stance on crime prevention); Chippendale, supranote 333, at 474 (claiming that
there are "serious drawbacks" involved in asking either the judiciary or the executive
branch to limit the federalization of crime and that Congress is in the best position
to impose limitations upon itself).
541 See Marshall, supra note 334, at 725-26 (expressing, although with considerable
doubt, that Lopez could be the first step toward the Supreme Court's eventual
imposition of "significant constitutional limitation on the reach of Congressional
power"); Ronald A. Giller, Note, FederalGun Controlin the United States: Revival of the
Tenth Amendment, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 151, 164-66, 169 (1994)
(discussing the decision of the circuit court in Lopez and expressing hope that the
Supreme Court would provide needed guidance on defining the necessary connection

between federal gun statutes and interstate commerce).
"4See Little, supra note 334, at 1072 ("The present question, then, is what
principles should govern federalization of dual jurisdiction criminal conduct.").
" See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 701-02 (1992) (noting that, while
federal courts have historically lacked the power to grant a divorce or alimony decree,
federal courts have always hadjurisdiction to enforce properly obtained decrees); see
also supra notes 314-18 and accompanying text (elaborating on Ankenbrandt's
statement that past cases did not intend to prevent federal courts from hearing any
case involving any domestic relations matter).
s" See Wallace, supra note 335, at 55.
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"importance" may easily lead to the expansion rather than the
retraction of criminal statutes because of the significant pressure on
legislators to consider the causes of all special interest groups to be
"important." 4 5 This pressure on legislators is likely to be especially
strong when the problem is national in scope and is a subject of
3 46
current concern.
Another proposed standard judges the propriety of federal
involvement by asking whether the states have "demonstrated
failure" in their attempts to enforce the criminal laws in question.341 In other words, if the effectiveness of state enforcement
is limited by the multistate aspects of the case and the conduct
involved is serious, a factor perhaps judged by the amount of money
involved, then it would be appropriate for the federal government
to exercise jurisdiction.3 48 Applying this standard to the CSRA, it
is clear that enforcement of § 228 is an area where federal criminal
jurisdiction is appropriate. The multistate nature of the transactions prevents states from effectively reaching those whom they wish
to prosecute, and the process of extradition is often slow and
ineffective in these cases. 49
Another articulation of the standard would require proof, even
when the states' authorities agree that federal assistance is necessary, that the states' enforcement efforts had, in fact, been ineffective." ° Such proof could consist of evidence of violations that
have gone unprosecuted, the amount of state resources that have
been unsuccessfully devoted to enforcement, and the adverse effects
that nonenforcement is having on the public interest.3 5'

Again,

this proof could be marshalled to support federal involvement
3 52
under the CSRA. As evidenced by the cases of Jeffrey Nichols
and others, flagrant violations of state law frequently went unpun"' See Marshall, supra note 334, at 734-35 (enumerating the problems inherent
when considering "importance" as the pivotal factor upon which to decide whether
or not
to federalize).
46
3 See id.
4
'
See Little, supra note 334, at 1078-81 (discussing the concept and application
of a "demonstrated state failure" standard); Mengler, supra note 340, at 526

(recommending federal jurisdiction where the "conduct is serious ... and state
enforcement
is impeded by the multistate or international aspects of the case").
48
See Mengler, supra note 340, at 526.
3
1

49
'o

See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
See Little, supra note 334, at 1078-79.
See id. at 1080 (emphasizing the importance of requiring actual "demonstra-

tion" in any effective version of the "demonstrated state failure" standard).
12

See supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text.
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ished until federal enforcement resources were used. The demand
for more state expenditures to meet the increasing burden of
interstate cases is also evidence that the state enforcement systems
are currently overwhelmed; the average caseworker only has time to
spend eight minutes per month on each case, and in such a hectic
environment, caseworkers become "customer driven," spending
their limited available time pursuing only the few cases concerning
which there is outside pressure.'" Moreover, it is undeniable that
the failure to obtain child support has an adverse effect on the
millions of children and custodial parents who may be left with
insufficient financial resources.
Another criticism leveled at the criminal provisions of the CSRA
is that criminal penalties are inappropriate for the failure to pay
debts and that there is no justifiable reason to treat child support
obligees differently from commercial obligees. 54 Although there
is no ironclad answer to this concern, it is reasonable to assume that
the risks of commercial nonpayment are figured into the costs of
commercial credit and that the risk of loss is a factor considered in
the normal course of business. Conversely, there is no way for a
child support obligee to guard against the risk of nonpayment.
Therefore, the nonpayment of child support is a more serious and
potentially devastating problem than is the nonpayment of commercial obligations. It could also be argued that criminal penalties are
punishing the failure to comply with the court's child support order
and not the failure to pay a personal debt.355
It is questionable whether federal criminal enforcement will be
able to increase the percentage of child support orders that are
actually paid when state criminal enforcement has failed to do so.
It is important to realize that many of the failures associated with
state criminal enforcement have resulted from the states' lack of
extraterritorial jurisdiction and the low priority given to requests for
extradition in those cases.3 56 In contrast, territorial jurisdiction

...
See Calhoun,supra note 31, at 941 (citing the statement of a program specialist
from the Virginia Division of Child Enforcement, who reported that caseworkers are
so overburdened that if they were actively to pursue every one of their cases, they
would be able to allot only minimal time to each case per month and that caseworkers, therefore, only spend significant and meaningful time on a small number of
cases).
'54 See MELLi ET AL., supra note 152, at 15-44 to 15-45 (finding that "the
constitutional argument that [the] use of contempt [of court] violates [state]
prohibitions against imprisonment for debt has largely been unsuccessful").
351 See, e.g., Ensley v. Ensley, 238 S.E.2d 920, 922 (Ga. 1977).
" See Lewis, supra note 5, at 29A; see also supra note 266 and accompanying text
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will not be able to defeat federal enforcement efforts. Moreover,
the deterrent effects of simply having the federal criminal law will
probably be substantial because criminal convictions carry a much
more severe social stigma than do civil contempt orders.3 57 Law
enforcement officials are also likely to act more quickly on a
criminal case than on a civil matter. 5s The threat of criminal
prosecution can act prospectively to deter those who have yet to fall
behind in support payments and can, thus, reduce the number of
enforcement cases in the future, especially when those cases that are
prosecuted by the Justice Department receive a great deal of public
attention.3 5 9 Finally, the federal statute allows the courts to order
restitution, so the obligation can be recovered in the same proceeding that imposes a criminal sanction. 6
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, it is clear that the decisions in
Schroeder, Mussari, Parker, and Bailey are wrong as matters of both
constitutional law and policy. The limitations on Congress's
authority to enact legislation under the Commerce Clause, which
were described in Lopez, are not exceeded by the criminal provisions
of the CSRA. Section 228 includes a specific jurisdictional limit on
federal authority, deals with an activity having a substantial impact
on the national economy, addresses the issue of interstate commerce in its legislative history, and does not violate the principles
of federalism. Also, as a question of policy, interstate child support
enforcement can be greatly aided by federal involvement. With
regard to federalism, it would be hard to claim that the federal
government usurps any of the states' powers when it merely acts to
provide additional resources and remedies that will benefit the

(describing the ease with which nonsupporting parents can flee the state to avoid
child support enforcement).
' When Michigan had a strict policy ofjailing nonsupporting parents, compliance
rates increased for both parents who had been previously jailed and those who had
never been incarcerated. See David L. Chambers, Men Who Know They Are Watched:
Some Benefits and Costs ofJailingforNonpayment of Support, 75 MICH. L. REv. 900, 921
(1977).
" See Calhoun, supra note 31, at 938-39.
359 See WEITZMAN, supra note 152, at 299 (arguing that a high probability of a jail
sentence is a very effective deterrent); DeadbeatDad Enforcement, supra note 186, at 2
(describing theJustice Department's 1995 media-supported campaign that attempted
to recover almost $1 million from § 228 violators in 28 cases in 13 states).
im See 18 U.S.C. § 228(c) (1994).
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citizens of the states and will add strength to state courts'judgments
by allowing them to be more easily enforced, and, thus more
meaningful.

